• The military vacuum in East Asia because of the unconditional surrender of the Japanese. It was expected that the Allies carry out a massive invasion of Japan. But the American decision to use nuclear weapons on Japan changed the picture. But when the Japanese surrendered, they were still holding on to large land tracts in Asia. There was no effective force to take over the vacuum.
• This was not the case in Europe, who was badly damaged physically. There was a strong military control over the territories.
• The Russian forces moved into North Korea and the Americans did so from the South. In many other places, native nationalist forces took over before any of the Allies could come in.
• The Chinese Civil War was in full swing.
  The Russians helped their part of Korea and so did the Americans.

• At the other end of the world, there were plans being made. Conference in San Francisco laid a framework for the post-war world.
• The UN was formed after its predecessor – the League of Nations. It was a union of nations against a war, which could use warnings, economic sanctions or direct intervention. The UN was to combine aspirations with unavoidable reality. Its fundamental job was to prevent another war. There were five major governors, for whom a voice was reserved through the Security Council (responsible for issuing new rules). Other smaller members were also included in the scheme, but there were five permanent members who had the right of veto. However, it was govts. who were the members of the UN. Sometimes, these govts. did not represent their people (Two-China/One-China Question). This created complications. The UN worked well as long as the states agreed. But the Cold War crippled the UN.
• The major powers. China, USSR, US. But at the moment, only the latter two could take charge of the matters and only the two of them could wage a total war. The US was richer than the USSR and was not devastated as the USSR. The USSR had a vulnerable geographical position, which was at the same time very good for offense. It had a strong, war-tested army. Both powers were highly suspicious of each other. Both had distinctly different ideologies, which they thought could each dominate the world.
  
  
• There was a stalemate in Europe, but there was no military in Asia.
• Korea was positioned just between Japan and China. China wanted it as a friendly buffer state against Japan. At the same time, Korea had a very long border with China and China would not tolerate a hostile regime there, as the Chinese industrial zone of Manchuria lay near. The USSR was also interested in Korea – spread the influence of communism, national interest (dominate SEA for its security).

Who would be the dominant power after the defeat of the Japanese? They used to be the dominant military power. In fact, the Japanese colonized the Koreans for their growing industrial and military power and for national security. Already even before the colonial times there was a split between the North and the South. The Northerners drifted towards the radical dissent against the Japanese, as they were more industrialized than the South. Naturally, they leaned towards the international communism. The only way to create unified Korea was to fundamentally reform and improve the society, as the Northerners thought.

The South was more traditional and was more under the control of landowners. The landowners supported the Japanese and without the Japanese, they wanted to return to traditional ways, not reform the society.

The Japanese also caused the exile-home split. Some people wanted to leave and others left. Those who stayed organized pressure against the Japanese. Those who left lost credibility and trust among the people, although they certainly had new ideas.

All these splits merged into a split between the communists (at home) and the royalists (abroad). Propaganda exaggerated the actions of the communists against the Japanese. Logically, the Japanese were not the kind of rulers to tolerate dissent.

• Synghman Rhee – a nationalist, resisted against the Japanese. Then, he fled the country and became a traditionalist. He wanted to restore the power of the elites, which he came from. He was a very authoritarian man, did not tolerate any dissent.
• Kim Il Sung – an adversary of Rhee. He was a battle-tested communist, inspired by the USSR’s model. Fought against the Japanese and aspired towards a socialist revolution.

In 1945, there was a partition planned for Korea. The American and the Russian armies would enter Korea, liberate it from the Japanese and leave the Koreans to decide on the way they wanted to go.

The Soviets wanted to help the KCP gain the upper hand all over Korea. But they did not want to do it by provoking the Americans. When the Americans landed, they realized that the USSR was firmly in control of the North Korea.

The Americans had no idea what to do about Korea. They were too busy trying to re-impose order all over the world. All they wanted to do was to chase the Japanese out and leave the Koreans to decide for themselves.

Moreover, the Americans were distracted from Korea by Eastern Europe. Likewise, Russia was more concerned about Germany and Eastern Europe. As a result, both countries decided not to contest each other, but in order to avoid the conflict, Korea was split along the 38th parallel. The Superpowers did not want to antagonize each other unnecessarily.

Korea became a trusteeship of the two countries. They promised to refer all the conflicts to the UN. The UN was also to devise a scheme for re-unification through elections. Everything was to be done by the consent of the international community.

Several questions arose: what was Korea to become and who was to rule it? This was answered by the politics and diplomacy. But towards 1945, there were de facto administrations supported by the respective sides. In the North, non-communists were persecuted. On the other side, Rhee, was sponsored by the American diplomats because there was no other anti-communist available. Since he was supported by the Americans, other powerholders of Korea started to group behind him, in order to have power on their side, should a confrontation with the North or the USSR occur.

Both leaders were unhappy with the situation and wanted to see a unified Korea and so tried to maneuver their respective camp leaders into a war. In the meantime, there was a conflict in the UN trusteeship (run by representatives of the international community). Soon, this resulted in a confrontation.

It became clear that there was a confrontation between the communists and the non-communists. Political at first, it became physical. Korea was in confusion.

Rhee could no longer purge the pro-Japanese leaders, as this would open the doors to the communists. Thus, he created a strong moral argument against himself. Interestingly, the two administrations were not even recognized as govts.. They wanted recognition and for that wanted to risk a war. In the meantime, Rhee became a profound embarrassment for the US.

In Europe, the Cold War was evolving. Now the Cold Warriors turned their attention to Asia, as a major battleground. There was no WWII to keep the USSR and the US as the allies and the existing tensions created hostility. The US envisioned a liberal world and wanted to spread that ideal. The USSR defended its ideology. For their purposes, they wanted to entrench their orders outside their borders. However, Europe was considered more important. The USSR took the treatment of Germany as the indicator of the Western goodwill towards itself. But the West, fearing German fall to communism and seeing it as a future market, refused to destroy the German economy through reparations. The USSR retaliated by increasing pressure elsewhere in Europe. Korea was left out for the moment, but each side was watching out for actions of the other side in there.

When Kim Il Sung attacked, it was not a war through a proxy, he wanted a civil war. But the superpowers saw it in a different light, once their relationship fell apart. And it shaped their behaviour in Korea. With the onset of the Cold War, the American policy towards Korea was being developed, not before that.

There was a call for withdrawal of armies from the Koreas and the Koreas were to have elections. To the leaders it looked as though they were to fend for themselves, which they did by starting the war.

The situation in America was precarious. McCarthyism raged (he wanted to make a political career, but ended up overturning lives of the people who did not hate communism violently enough). The Soviet pressure in Europe increased in response to the German question. This increased the perception that there was a Soviet threat, which was to be confronted, firmly and quickly. The ‘loss’ of China fueled the fire. The Americans fell for the ‘domino theory’ and there was a need to preserve Korea from the fall to communism, else it would spread. As the last blow, the USSR tested a nuclear bomb, destroying the American nuclear monopoly. The policy of containment was adopted and NSC68 (National Security Council Report, which increased military expenditure) passed. Any form of appeasement was rejected. The American policy became fully formed by then.

NATO was formed – first peacetime military alliance with foreign powers. This was a significant change in the American foreign policy. But at the same time, just after the war, the US demobilized its army.

• The Soviets wanted to help Kim take all over of Korea, but did not want to fight the Americans. Historians are not sure who gave a green light to the attack. The Soviets were willing to support North Koreans, but not in the war – a potentially dangerous situation right from the start.
• The Americans tried to keep Rhee on a tight leash, but did not want to keep large forces of their own there.
• Kim and Rhee were eager to destroy each other. Kim persuaded Stalin to let him take a calculated risk.
• Stalin did this to provoke trouble between China and the USA.
• The Korean War was a genuine civil war.
• But from the start it was driven by, and would be determined by the larger Cold War.

For the rest of the world the war started with an attack, although the real war began much earlier.

The North Koreans advanced very rapidly. There was a temporary border, which was legally recognized, so there was a war. The attack of the north was a surprise attack.

Why the surprise?

• The January speech – containment. New govt. was formed in Beijing and the USA and other countries faced a dilemma of how to react to it. The USA decided to recognize and support KMT in order to prevent a Sino-Soviet alliance. That distracted the USA from South Korea.
• Such ‘forgetfulness’ caused the Soviet leadership to think that the US would not care for South Korea. The Soviets and North Korea tried to conceal the build-up of force, so the USA did not know about the danger. Also, they advanced the idea that no one would want to break the uneasy peace in Korea.
• Europe remained the focus of all the politics. Hence, attention of the international community was distracted from Korea.
• The CIA was supposed to keep track of what went on. But it was a new organization and lacked experience. Also, it was focused on Europe. Moreover, the CIA focused on listening in on conversations of other people (intercepted messages). But the Russians and Koreans did not pass messages by air. They used other methods and the Americans were unaware.
• Thus, the Americans and the South Koreans were not mentally or physically ready for the war.

Why the North Koreans moved so far so fast?

• The ROK army was weak and unprepared.
• The US ground forces were unprepared and there was no transportation available to move them all at the same time for a good defense. Instead, they arrived by useless its and pieces. No modern equipment was sent to Korea, as it was diverted to Europe.
• The only American forces that could respond immediately was aviation, but the troops were so mixed, that the Americans realized they could not hit the northerners, without hitting their own troops and civil aviation. Moreover, aviation could not retaliate all by itself.
• Tanks (T34-85, quite an old model, but considering the fact that the South did not have anti-tanks or any vehicles of matching power, they were efficient) and vehicles were supplied by the Soviets. The Koreans also had some of the Soviet expertise and the Soviet army was a skilled one.
• The north Koreans were pressed by Moscow to move fast, before the Americans could get bits and pieces of power together for a retaliation.

• The American response and the Soviet and the Chinese reaction were to determine the course of the war and its nature.
• The Soviets boycotted Security Council meetings and could not stop the military intervention. One view is that the Russians did it on purpose in order to push the Americans and the Chinese against each other.
• The UN resolution: “member nations to render such assistance to the ROK as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area”. What exactly does ‘restore international peace and security’ mean? Now, the Americans could roll back communism under the protection issued by the UN. Many member states agreed to send help to South Korea, although the attack was carried out under the American leadership. This resolution brought an international dimension to the conflict and it gave legitimacy to the American actions.
• The Soviet boycott allowed the USA to do what it wanted to do. How much do individuals matter in mass politics? Truman was a decisive president – would any other president retaliate as fast as he did? Would it change the course of the war?
• The war, together with international political background, caused a rise of McCarthyism at home. Macarthur went over the dividing line, but Truman wanted to make a point of the fixed border and a punishment for violating it.
• What was the war aim of the UN? To preserve South Korea or to destroy North Korea? What did the American leadership want? But the control of course of the war was hijacked by General Macarthur. So, the course of the war became guided by his view. He thought that the confrontation between communism and capitalism was unavoidable and he thought that it might start sooner than later (the Americans felt that the nuclear gap was contracting and they ought to take advantage of it as soon as possible). He started lobbying for the totality of this war, so that it served as a pretext to the showdown.

• This is where the decisive military confrontations took place.
• The North Koreans lacked detailed plans, so they slowed down, when they passed Han River.
• Only at Pusan did the Americans managed to stop and build up a kind of defence line. The line the Americans managed to hold was about 50 miles wide. North Koreans frequently penetrated the American and the North Korean positions threatening the US headquarters at Taegu. The defence was extremely bloody for the Americans. The North Koreans started having problems at this point – it was difficult for them to replace losses.
• Around Pusan Macarthur re-grouped his forces in a perimeter defense, in order to keep the northerners out and to allow a place for the supplies to land.
• North Korean Army still had initiative but was running out of time, race to beat US reinforcements, had to attack hard.
• UN forces were now larger, better supply positions. UN forces anchored on good ground behind Naktong River. At the same time, North Koreans had no reserves, no more troops and the USSR was reluctant to send supplies, as it wanted to avoid a total war over an unimportant state. Also, the North Koreans were concentrated in a small stretch of peninsula, the American aviation could attack effectively. Airpower and heavy weapons now better able to find and pound enemy in a pitted battle.
• “There are no lines behind which we can retreat… A retreat to Pusan would result in one of the greatest butcheries in history. We must fight to the end. We must fight as a team. If some of us die, we will die fighting together.”

• How to counterattack? To push the North Koreans back to where they came from? This was safe, and this would protect Pusan lifeline. It would roll the enemy back over the line.
• But Macarthur rose another possibility – to attack the North Koreans on the side and from the back – to attack Inchon. It would cut off the North Koreans and force them to defend or even to surrender.

• The North Koreans might disrupt lifeline at Pusan, they might expect the attack.
• Tides were extremely high and allowed only 2-3 hours for the landing. Current was extremely strong.
• The landing will have to happen in the evening, which will leave the amphibious troops with only 3 hours of daylight to find defensible positions in 250,000 city.
• Moreover, the bay was surrounded with high hills, which would ease the job of the defenders.
• Inchon on the other hand was the only plausible option for such an attack. Kunsan was too close to the besieged Pusan perimeter, so a landing there would be meaningless. Chinnampo, Pyongyang’s port, was too far north. Posung-Myon, below Inchon offered inadequate opportunities for breaking further inland.
• Before the Americans would be able to assault Inchon, they would have to signal their intentions 11 hours in advance by seizing the off-shore island of Wolmi-do.
• Despite the many months in Korea, the US knew little about its topography.
• At first, because of these risks, the Joint Chiefs of Staff declined the proposal. But MacArthur deeply believed in the strength of the American Navy. The only argument in his favour, it seemed was the fact that nobody expected an American attack there.
• But if risks are high, so are the winnings. The South Koreans might annihilate the enemy. Macarthur persuaded the leadership to allow him to carry out this plan. This caused the leadership to reconsider the aims of the war. But these possibilities were not considered.
• It was discovered that only 500-1500 troops were guarding Inchon. The strength of North Korean attacks masked the amount of losses they actually suffered since the beginning of the invasion. In fact, at Pusan, they had 70,000 against Walker’s 140,000. The Allies possessed the absolute command of the sea and air.
• Despite the fact that the Inchon invasion was a very badly kept secret, nothing was known to Pyongyang.
• MacArthur decided to split the command. He appointed Almond to command the landing force at Inchon, not Walker. Almond was a good soldier and good with men, but a rather undistinguished commander. He dismissed the difficulties of the landing at Inchon. Walker did a good job defending Pusan and was left there. At Inchon, somebody with more imagination was needed. The marines themselves possessed the experience of WWII. Almond did not want to lose the surprise element by keeping Wolmi-do, but was convinced to back down. The attack started at 4.45 pm. The communists were taken by surprise.
• By accepting Macarthur’s plan, Truman tilted the possibilities towards a total war.
• Macarthur pushed north creating irresistible political and military momentum. He was about to annihilate communism in Korea! Military success of the plan helped to advance its political component.
• Inchon was attacked from the sea. The attack was a spectacular success, just 20 Americans were killed. The gamble succeeded. The North Koreans tried to re-take Inchon, but were swept off. The Americans have been traditionally successful in amphibious operations. The capturing of Inchon enabled the Americans to bring in more supplies. The tables were reversed. The capture of Seoul (25-27th of September – it was attacked from three sides – north, south and west) restored the lines of communications (as roads converged at the capital).Aviation was covering the flanks of the divisions. Even the local Koreans were delighted to see the Americans. The spell of bad luck appeared to have been broken.
• Thereafter, Walker’s 8th army started to break out. Walker’s success as keeping Pusan established him as a hero. Aviation helped.
• The North Koreans fled in disorder. They lost especially important vehicles and other military equipment. At the end of September, the American high leadership and the UN decided to allow the army push over the 38 parallel. The reason for authorization was that UN resolution – because only through total annihilation that the threat to peace could be restored. The debate was whether it was the South Koreans or South Koreans and the Americans should advance.
• China became alarmed with movements of such a large army.

• Truman pledged to protect Taiwan. The Chinese understood that the US refused to reconsider its position.
• Thus, American troops on their long border with Korea, were highly unwanted. The PRC also feared a possibility that the US might bring KMT forces to reunited Korea. Moreover, China could not afford to maintain a large army on the border, in order to deter an attack, the funds were needed for domestic reconstruction.
• Furthermore, the Soviets were reluctant to actively support the North Korean army or to intervene. This meant that China could not count on the USSR for the resolution of this problem.
• The American leadership considered all these and sent Macarthur a signal not to go to the Chinese border and not to cross the 38th parallel. Again, a question of the objection of the war was recalled. After all, a war with China might lead to a wider war, which might escalate to nuclear.
• The speed of advance, however, limited the control of the American govt. and gave the power to the man on the spot.

• US war aims remained inherently vague – the war was too fast, the govt. could not decide what it wanted.
• It was very hard to rein in a commander in the field rapidly winning a war. The public opinion was also on his side, thanks to constant media updates on successes. Moreover, a stop would create an impression that the govt. was weak and provoke radical currents.
• MacArthur took advantage of this fluid situation.
• What about Macarthur himself? Was he a lunatic, or was he under the influence of his own success and could not stop his army? In fact, he intended to hit the USSR very hard in order to deter its future attempts to gain control. Also, he hoped that this attack would inspire KMT to re-start a civil war. He hoped that Chinese govt. would topple because of the danger posed and the upkeep of defending the borders.

• The UN army was driving north hoping that victory was near. On the other side of the river, the Chinese ‘volunteers’ were about to launch a counterattack from a hill in the middle Korea trying to separate the UN forces from supplies. The northern territories were quickly recovered.
• The Chinese infiltrated into the North Korea secretly and separated the UN forces which were forced to evacuate.
• How did it happen? MacArthur became convinced that China was not going to attack and that north Koreans were defeated, divided his army for speed. The Washington politicians allowed him to roll back communists in North Korea, but did not allow him to go over the Chinese border. But MacArthur wanted to finish the war before the Chinese would have time to intervene. However, his subordinates tried to warn him that the Chinese knew about the division and were going to intervene. But his own agenda seemed more important to him.
• Why were the UN armies pushed back in November 1950? The Chinese attacked with a great force – the people sent were not volunteers, but troops hardened in the battles against the nationalists and the Japanese. They were worried that the Americans would attack their home country. He split up his army and did not believe that China was going to intervene. The armies on the ground were becoming sloppy – it takes a very strong leadership to keep them organized, but MacArthur and his generals were too busy with speed and political agenda. The weather impeded airpower – there was no airpower. Hence, strong and powerful advance by the Chinese forces.
• However, the Chinese attack did not annihilate the UN armies. The Chinese missed the best chance they had to win the war in one stroke.
• What saved the UN armies in December 1950? UN airpower: punished large Chinese attacks, added burdens to supply lines. The weather was not uniformly bad and the UN forces managed an attack at the Chinese. As the Chinese pushed further north, the longer and weaker their communication lines became. In order to maintain strong pressure at the front, the Chinese had to pause to wait for the frontline to be ordered and re-supplied. The Chinese did not have good means of transportation, they used people and animals – this reduced their vulnerability from the air, but at the same time impeded the speed of progress, which was the crucial factor in this war. The American marines fought staunchly around Chosin – the Chinese had to go through Chosin, and although the marines were not prepared, they did not listen to MacArthur and kept forces on a guard. This was a bloody fight, but it delayed the Chinese and destroyed many their troops. This was the next significant battle after Inchon. The American vehicles were fast enough to retreat, if the soldiers could not fight. This saved them for future fights.

On the drive north of the 38th parallel, MacArthur had deliberately separated the Eighth Army from the operations of X Corps, which were under Almond. Almond did not get along well with Smith, the commander of the corps. Smith told Almond that they should go to Yalu by either Chosin or by the north-west route, but not both. Almond despised Smith for sluggishness, Smith – Almond – for desire for personal glory. Smith tried to make sure that at every point, the supplies of ammunition were maintained – hence the slowness of progress.

The Chinese were in front of the advancing Marines and the commanders were oblivious to that fact, although they could have guessed it. The Chinese attacked at night on the 27th of November. They did not cause the Marines to collapse, but did inflict severe casualties. By morning, the marines were holding three separate perimeters – at Yudam-ni, Koto-ri and Hagaru. Many of the American positions were accessible only by truck – and now they were vulnerable to the attack and isolation by the enemy of whose positions they knew very little. The only track from Hungnam to Yudam-ni provided fragile communication. Chosin reservoir became the crucial spot for defence. Hagaru perimeter was reinforced.

The Marines from Koto-ri tried to join with another group and met severe resistance from the Chinese. The Chinese then attacked Hagaru where the American engineers were struggling hard to repair the runway.

The Americans found the bitter cold demoralizing. Cold was killing them better than enemy. Smith was the key figure – he kept defences strong. The communists were attacking from the hills. Smith moved southwards, which was considered by many as a retreat, but he claimed that they were merely advancing in the opposite direction. He managed to unite the division in Yudam-ni with the one in Hagaru.

The performance of the 1st Marine Division earned it the fame of heroes. Only on the 10th of December did the Marines started evacuating through the port of Hamhung.

• The Chinese missed a golden opportunity to win in one stroke by killing all the troops caught unaware. The marines did a heroic act.
• The Chinese attack and the reversal of the war re-ignited all the political debate. China had its own problems too.
• China’s problems.
  • It did not have enough airpower to counter the American forces. The fighting asset of the Chinese army was a great number of experienced and determined troops, but they realized that the Americans were just as determined but had firepower.
  • Logistics was another problem faced by the Chinese. MacArthur was well-supplied by the Americans, but not the Chinese. The Chinese supplies were intercepted with the UN airpower.
  • The ‘allies’ posed another problem. Kim-Il-Sung suffered defeat and to restore his glory he demanded that the Chinese advanced very fast, but could not help and only distracted them. Only the Russians could provide the Chinese with military supplies. But Stalin insisted on giving just enough to let the Chinese stay on, but not to win the war. Stalin was trying to control the course of the war. He was afraid that if the Chinese were too successful, the US might use nuclear bombs on the USSR. He was willing to see the Americans defeated, but not at the expense of USSR. He wanted all the advantage he could pick-up in Korea, but did not want to risk WWIII because of Korea.
  • The Americans understood that they were not fighting the volunteers, but the regular army. They knew that the Chinese realized that in order to fulfill the UN resolution, the Americans would have to attack and neutralize China. China now had a strong enemy – not the South Koreans, but the US army.
• Now, the two greatest powers of the world were in a direct conflict. MacArthur lost credibility. He was no longer winning a war, but was causing a greater conflict. He was accused of allowing the US forces to be humiliated and the US to lose its credibility. He was represented as being evil. MacArthur’s general lost control of the army hoping for a near victory. Fortunately, MacArthur died on the way to the US.

• Ridgeway was to replace MacArthur. He did not have the humiliation of MacArthur. He had long experience in the military, was focused on the essentials, and not some vague political agenda.
• The situation was fluid: the Chinese were advancing, but they could be stopped because of the problems they faced. To accomplish the move, the UN troops needed to be re-organised and brought together. Ridgeway’s professionalism lay in this area. Ridgeway kept the focus.
• During the civil war the Chinese troops developed a tactic of a slow build-up. Now they had to move very quickly, they did. Ridgeway learned that the Chinese always tried to attack at night, to get behind their target and to use noise to scare and distract the enemy. Ridgeway used this knowledge to his advantage. He pushed his man forward, away from retreating, made them fight in the open, not woods, got them to stop using vehicles.
• Ridgeway began a lobby which would change the war. Previously, the method and the objective of the war were very loosely connected. He questioned the aims of the war and asked for more definite plan. This helped him to work out a better plan. This pressed the US politicians for clarity.
• All these helped Ridgeway to slow down the advance of the Chinese.
• The War Policy debate by 1951. How should the war be fought?
  • Truman was convinced to allow the general to fight his own war to stop the Chinese, but Ridgeway also made Truman re-consider the war aims and objectives. By that time, the Chinese were slowing down and began to struggle to hold their positions. Beijing decided to prevent the North Korea from being annihilated, although it did not lose hope of annihilating the South.
  • Pentagon focused on the war on the threat to Europe, not Korea.
  • The British were getting alarmed. They feared the Chinese intervention and more importantly, they did not believe that the Soviets were behind this war (the Americans still believed in it) – so the Chinese were not under the similar restraint – they would go not fearing a nuclear annihilation to win that war (Britain did not want that); the British were also afraid that should the UN become too successful the UN might intervene and did not want that. Hence, the UK wanted to turn the war in a stalemate.
  • In the US, the Rebublican party applied pressure to end the war.
  • There was also a fear of possible collapse in Korea, which might cause a bad stroke on US credibility.
  • Both USSR and the USA were trying to draw as much support from the rest of the world as they could to defend their cause and its credibility. How far will this war escalate?
  • There was public fury about the threat to the troops.

• MacArthur cried for justice. He accused the leadership of restricting him at the expense of the American prestige. He was correct militarily – the best way to win the war was to squash the enemy’s supply bases in Manchuria. But this would be at the expense of the national policy. What was the US trying to achieve, as it would have a worldwide effect.
• MacArthur insisted that military strategy should have immediate political repercussions. Truman asked himself if he would use nuclear weapons to fight for Korea. He ‘carelessly’ dropped that he always considered the use of nuclear weapons. This was meant to frighten the Chinese, but it frightened the British.
• Truman meets Attlee. This meeting was about protecting democracy and defending the UN rules. He was asked if it was possible to stop short of a nuclear war, which was already on the way. At the meeting, Truman quietly conceded that he would never use the nuclear weapons, would never try to defeat China or North Korea, but would never acknowledge this to China or Russia. At the same time, other people were reaching similar decisions – the war should not be escalated, but the Americans/Russians would try to win, but the nuclear weapons would not be used. Hence, the war became limited – in means and automatically in aims.
• MacArthur was hurt by this. He suggested to fight to win whatever it takes. He thought there would be a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet bloc sooner or later. So, the victory, to him, should be achieved whatever it takes. He was merely advocating what was the American way of thinking thus far. Joint Chiefs stuff: wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time. It was decided at the highest level that a nuclear war should be fought only if survival is at stake, not in Korea. This was the first time the US did not follow its old rule.
• Operation Killer: Ridgeway tries to grind the Chinese and push them back. The Chinese could no longer resist. In 1952, the Americans took Seoul. This strengthened his argument that China could be defeated without an attack on it. Ridgeway used air and fire power to kill as many Chinese as possible, rather than to affect as many targets as possible – this was meant to persuade the Chinese to withdraw.
• MacArthur was long proposing to bomb sources of power in Korea and China, but Washington refused, fearing that the Chinese might escalate the war. The UN and Washington did allow bombing, explicitly prohibiting the bombing of power stations. Instead the Chinese were given an option of peaceful settlement.
• MacArthur wanted to carry the offensive inside the Chinese borders, thus causing China to collapse. This horrified Washington. Truman issued a reprimand to MacArthur. But on the 5 April MacArthur informed Washington of his continuing with the plans. He got the 5th Fleet to patrol the coast, thus inviting a Chinese attack after which a total confrontation would be very likely. There was information that the USSR already sent to China Illushin bombers capable of carrying nuclear bombs.
• He showed once and for all that he was not prepared to accept the political constraints. He was seen trying to involve the UN in war against China.
• This proved MacArthur wrong. He was dismissed by Truman, as he did not support the policy of the UN and the US. This killed two birds with one stone: Truman proved his toughness, Truman reinforced the American policy line and showed MacArthur who was the boss.

• The US would not expand the war. The UN resolution was abandoned, but peace was about to be restored.
• US would not seek outright military victory. The US has not fought an inconclusive war ever since 1812. The US approached warfare as win-destroyed situation – all the wars were to be fought to the bitter end, as a crusade against evil. This was a historic and crucial decision.
• US would not break with its allies. MacArthur blamed the British for preventing the American bloc for being unable to face the communist bloc. But the US leadership disagreed with this view – it believed that all the non-communist countries had to come together.
• US would not alter priorities: Europe came first. The sacking of MacArthur was the public way of demonstrated this policy line. This also caused a relief in Moscow – the communists were relieved to know that there would not be a total nuclear war.

• Ridgeway agreed with this policy line and worked towards it – efficiency. The Chinese could not advance, the Russians were reluctant to help. Ridgeway adopted a tactic of slow grinding. The war turned into a stalemate. He worked towards improving the morale of the troops, by formulating war aims clearer to them. Of Ridgeway the war was no longer a crusade for the Korean liberty, but for the liberty of the whole world. He was determined not to emulate MacArthur’s remote style of command.
• The military results shaped the political decisions. His strategy weakened MacArthur’s stance on political moves and shaped the US future policy.

• Equivalent power on the battlefield. Both sides had advantages, which the other side found difficult to overcome. The Chinese had the land which was easy to defend and they were numerous. The Americans had strong air and naval power, which the Chinese could not defeat. But this dominance did not prevent the Chinese from getting their supplies. Thus, neither side could inflict a military defeat upon the other.
• Some allies thought that since the situation was stabilized the war could be ended. Others thought that the north could be forced to surrender.
• A battle of exhaustion. Both had the physical potential to bring in more military power into the war. But the US wanted to deploy that power into Europe. The Chinese were afraid of the Japanese. Thus, the deadlock was formed. The best decision was thus to accept the deadlock.
• Again, what was happening on the ground (military) was driving the political decisions (politics). Had the Chinese been crushed before they could attack, the policy would be different. However, military was not entirely governing the politics. E.g. despite MacArthur’s assertions, the American leadership decided not to fight the WWIII over Korea.
• US War aims June 1951: “…an end to hostilities and return to the status quo – 8th Army to inflict enough attrition on the foe to induce him to settle on these terms”. This was much clearer than the UN resolution. The US focused on the limited aims and means of the war. To convince the enemy that the war is more than he can bear.
• Why ‘the question’ was settled by June 1951 – but the war was not? Why was the ceasefire not signed immediately?
  • Only the USA or the USSR could expand this war into a total war. China or Koreas could not step the escalation up.
  • Both had now decided that they would not do so.
  • But neither were willing to bail out on their allies, fearing their credibility would suffer. Neither were they willing to cause radioactive contamination of the world.
  • But neither was willing to accept the victory of the other side. So they fought on.

The questions dealt with were concerned with how the war is to be ended and why should it be ended. Both leaders – Rhee and Kim Il Sung needed to re-establish their authority at home and with their allies. The Americans were trying to resolve these questions with their allies. Similar disagreements ravaged the Soviet side. These were the ongoing political duels, which shaped the final years of the war.

The Soviet ambassador in the UN suggested that negotiations should be started with regards to cease-fire. By this, the Soviets indicated that they wanted to explore ceasefire and that they did not want to escalate the war any further. The question of where should the negotiations be held and who should participate arose – it was important to both sides, as each wanted to negotiate peace from the position of power. In early July the meeting was decided on. On larger level, the sides would work out how the world works and how it should work.

It was believed that the conflict was a natural continuation of political duels. After all, the Soviets saw the conflict as being inevitable. Thus, the Russians were willing to bring the battle to the table. Ridgeway kept thinking. In the meantime, the Communist forces paraded in front of the south Koreans to show that they were entering negotiations from the point of strength. The UN negotiators were caught by it. Thus, no progress was made at the talks. Both sides refused to make concessions – and they sat at the meeting for 2h 11m.

At first the prospects seemed good. The USSR did not press for withdrawal of foreign troops, but was instead more interested in exploring the subject of ceasefire. Moreover, in the USSR, the ideas of possible coexistence of two different economic systems began appearing. The US also felt that the war was bringing about more international focus on the embarrassment of Rhee’s autocratic govt..

The US declared her willingness to negotiate peace in such a way, as though the USSR were begging for it and the US was about to dictate her conditions through first dictating the time and the place. Ridgeway wanted to have the meeting in Korea, but this was rejected by the US because it could look like the US was asking for peace. The USSR proposed Kaesong, but the US refused for fear that the town could be captured by the communists at any moment. The US in fact believed that her proposing the talks first weakened her position. Ridgeway wanted to send William Sebald, the State Dept’s political adviser to the talks, but Washington refused saying that military and political issues should not be confused.

Neither side of Korea wanted to end the war. However, both were too dependent on outside aid to exercise a decisive voice of their own. The USSR felt that China and North Korea wanted to continue the war, but she did not want to risk a military confrontation and pressed for peace. Moreover, the Chinese troops lived off the land in North Korea was worsening the relations between the two communist countries and send a bad image to the West. Both PRC and the USSR recognized advantages in seeking peace settlement.

The USSR saw the gradual re-armament of NATO, West Germany and the making of peace with Japan. These were forces that would draw the Western camp together and would strengthen it. She hoped that by concluding the ceasefire these trends could be arrested or even reversed. The war of attrition might put pressure on Truman administration to expand the war and the communists realized that they lacked strength to defeat the communists. On the other hand, the war of attrition might wear the enemy down and persuade him to negotiate on more favourable terms. Hence, the USSR had doubts about the timing of the talks. (In fact, so did the USA).

Before the talks started, the communists captured Kaesong to pressurize the UN and the US forces into agreeing to the USSR’s conditions. Under the communist arrangements, the representatives of the UN had no freedom to move about and access the place from outside – this was another show of strength. Armed personnel was prohibited. Negotiations began in earnest on the 27 July. However, the communist forces paraded in full uniform – this was a deliberate move too. On the 23rd of August, the communists claimed that the UNC bombed the negotiations site. This turned out to be an entirely fabricated claim.

The Cold War was spilling out into the third world. This intimidated the UN.

Objectives of armistice: to end fighting, to ensure safety for the UN forces. It was to provide for a demilitarized zone 20 miles wide. The POWs should be exchanged.

• Communists wanted 38th parallel, UN wanted battle line. I.e. the communists wanted the restoration of pre-war positions. The UN wanted the line to stay where it was and that both sides mutually withdrew from it to form a demilitarized zone. The USSR disagreed. However, the 38th was an indefensible line. While the negotiations were ongoing, Mao authorised the Twentieth Army Corps to move into Korea. Currently, the battle line was above the 38th parallel, which made the agreement disadvantageous for the communists. By the 20th of August, the UNC started a limited push forward, which was even worse and the Soviets felt they needed more time, although prior to that, they were more likely to agree with the UN proposal.
• The communists overdid the parading and made the US indignant. This might have been the Soviet ‘excuse’ for breaking off negotiations they did not want (because their proposal of 38th parallel was rejected). It might have been an attempt to stall and hope that the European allies pressurize the US to soften her stand. This realization made the US even more rigid and unwilling to negotiate at that time.
• The PRC was reluctant to participate in the negotiations. Soon, the communists were to start their second offensive in spring. China was wary that the US was out to ruin her.
• The USSR accused the US of provocations and wanting to wage a total war.
• The US feared that after the armistice, the USSR would be freer to wage unrest in other regions – Yugoslavia, Vietnam, Burma etc.. The war also confined Beijing’s resources and prevented China from intervening in more crucial areas: e.g. Formosa, Indochina. The USSR saw it from a similar perspective too. She felt that in Korea, American resources would be tied down. At the same time, SEA was in turmoil and the newly formed states had a tendency of looking towards communism, so the USSR did not have to intervene, she only had to prevent American intervention.
• The conflict provided the US with a training ground to combat the expanding communism. Valuable skills gained in this way could be applied elsewhere, in more important areas, to combat communism.
• In the US it was felt by some that a divided country will be more likely to fall to the communism than a strong united one. So it was felt that the USSR should continue the war for unification.
• Each suspected the other of stalling to cover an imminent attack. The USSR launched a newspaper attack accusing the US of wanting to maintain troops in Korea.
• The USSR also did not like the prospects of the upcoming American conference with the Japanese on the 4th of September. So she wanted to express protests and possibly derail the talks with her barrage of accusations. In early September, the communists stepped up military activity in Korea. MIGs and YAKs were sent to the North and the communists showed more aggression in Europe as well. Soon after, the USSR started talking about friendship with the West again. This did not produce the desired result.
• With the passage of time the condition of the North Korean and the Chinese troops deteriorated. They were suffering without supplies and Mao cancelled one of the pre-planned offensives. This served to reduce the bargaining strength of the USSR and she tried to withdraw.
• Each Korean govt. denied the legitimacy of the other and hence refused to negotiate.
• The POWs on both sides – the question of ceasefire would involve sending them back. But some of them did not want to go back, which would become a defeat of prestige for the govt.. Moreover, the UN had about 150,000 POWs, while the North Koreans – less than 10,000.
• The US demanded that Korea was open to the Red Cross and that observation of Korea by military inspection teams was allowed to prevent further aggression. The communists omitted these.
• The question of complete military withdrawal was raised by the USA as it was the best way to monitor aggression. The maneuvering went for two weeks, but did not progress at all. This showed that a certain balance of power that was difficult to change was already established at the peninsula.
• The determination of both sides to test enemy’s every step reflected the enormous cultural, ideological and circumstantial gaps.
• Each side wanted the agreement to look like its victory. Both sides wanted the talks to happen at a later time. And both sides were not anxious enough to conclude a ceasefire.

• American desire to blockade PRC, and refusal to connect Korea and Taiwan issues. The Americans wanted to respond severely to the actions of the PRC in Korea.
• American reluctance to consult on use of nuclear weapons in general. The South Koreans wanted to be allied with America.
• Dispute over priorities: need to build up NATO, but also to hold South Korea. The South Korean question was also crucial, although the US wanted to avoid it.
• Ridgeway insisted that the Soviets agree to the UN proposal or the US breaks off the talks. One month was given for consideration. The Soviets did not agree. In October another extension was granted, but nothing came out. Nobody could change the battlefront, without committing much more military.
• Politically, no progress could be made either. No country could admit a defeat, as it would result in huge loss of prestige and popularity of the govt. even inside the country.
  
  
  

• “… in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea” – it indicated the American likelihood of lifting the restrictions on Ridgeway’s going into China. The threat was made. It was not the re-opening the question of war or the sake of victory, but in order to get the talks going. This indicated how high the frustration was.
• Rhee supported the move. If the peace was settled, he wanted to show the world that North Korean POWs did not want to go home – to disgrace North. Kim Il Sung foresaw it and demanded that all the prisoners were returned home before he would agree to negotiate the ceasefire.

• Communist forces: 1.2 mil.
• Ratio 7 Chinese : 2 Koreans
• The Chinese did not want to lose their elite troops in order for the USSR and North Korea to achieve a more favourable agreement and to save their prestige. China wanted to withdraw troops.
• UN forces: 770,00 – 60% ROK, 33% American, 7% UN.

• Both sides chose war in the hills.
• The sides were jockeying for the positions. The war became pointless. No one tried to make a decisive breakthrough.
• Mobility almost disappeared. Raids were denied and the focus remained on consolidating positions – war of position.
• The communist forces decided to settle for whatever they could get. So they tried to get their way with regards to the prisoners of war and the territory. Thus, they assumed a defensive position. But the other side also came to a similar conclusion although a bit later. Thus, the war became defensive on both sides.
• The war became tactical. Thus, the hills became very important. So the sides fought for hills, hoping to win them over one by one and slowly to improve their position. The hills in which the war took place were very inhospitable. Hill warfare was expensive. Supplies had to be driven or flown to the battle line, which was dangerous and difficult. The strain was to keep the war going instead of winning it.
• The UN forces tried to attack at Inchon and the communists had to divert their forces. The communists could not attack from behind as they did not have naval superiority.
• Clark took over the command of ROK forces.
• There was a riot in one of the prisons in ROK. The Americans and ROK tried to win the prisoners over and to make them admit that they did not want to go home. North Korea had to work hard to keep the loyalty of men. ROK tried to force confession out of these men. The UN refused to use weapons to put the riot down – if it did, the USSR would say that they were killing people to prevent them from going home. But the rebellion had to be suppressed. Should force be used to keep POWs in order?
• This served as another excuse to break the negotiations down.
• The UN army had another card to play.

• War in the air. It took place concurrently with the war of the ground forces. The Operation was directed by General Otto Weyland, who believed in victory through air power. He believed that it could extinguish the enemy’s will to fight and that it spared the UN forces the fighting. Britain opposed such unrestricted raids on civilian centres.
• Benefits of dominating the air:
  • Move your troops and equipment without interference, in all elements.
  • Attack enemy forces and installations – bases, railroads, warehouses etc.
  • Deny freedom of movement to the enemy and scout out his movements and positions. This slows the enemy down.
  • Railroads were bombed – the supplies of the NOK army were disrupted.
• Dominance of the sea did not allow the UN to cut supplies from China, but they were cut off from supply from anywhere else.
• The air dominance of ROK caused the communists to divert troops.
• Airpower was thus an asset that might be able to win the war – by breaking enemy’s will and/or ability to fight. Fighter aircrafts were put to use to protect air superiority. At the same time, it took a lot of resources to keep aircrafts, to provide airfields. But once in place, the aircrafts could be a deadly force – mobile and strong. The UN and the allies were able to deploy enough airpower to make it an important asset.
• The communists responded by supplying ‘volunteer pilots’ who flew aircrafts and supported the NOK forces. They could contest the skies and reduce the advantage, which the UN forces had in the air. The US supplied more aircraft, but again, their commitment was elsewhere. In general, the allied pilots were more experienced than North Korean – hence the advantage. The American air force threatened to go into China and bomb it to create chaos.
• The UN could not outfight the communist forces on the ground, but it could commit all the available airpower to strangle the communist forces out of supplies and battle spirit. However, the communist forces needed much less supplies than the allied armies needed to keep fighting. Thus, it was easier for the communists to strangle the allies than the other way round. Nevertheless, the air force could strangle much life out of the communist forces, but they would not give up.
• The allies tried to reciprocate their demands against the communists. That is, if they do something to the communists, which they themselves do not like, the communists would suffer. This was not the case. Moreover, the strangle showed that air force alone was not enough to win the war.
• Another operation called ‘air pump’ was started. It was an attack on infrastructure. It was an attempt to destroy all the infrastructure in North Korea by destroying power plants, warehouses etc… But the attack was started in June – so it was easier to survive without electricity. The planners were again wrong in estimating the minimum level at which the army and the country could function. The Korean army relied on humans rather than on machinery and it was difficult to destroy humans. The army could still keep fighting.
• There were only two ways to win the war: to attack Chinese bases in Manchuria and another one was a nuclear attack on NOK. But the second way would cause unpredictable consequences.
• The point proven: air force was important in preventing an enemy from winning, but it was not a war-winning asset.
• Thus, the UN played its last card short of nuclear escalation.

• Somebody had to give in, else the fighting would go on forever.
• Eisenhower and Dulles became President and the Vice-President. He promised to stop the war.
• The Russians got the Americans involved into the war, without losing people themselves. Eisenhower realized this and worked towards disengagement in order to involve American forces elsewhere more productively.

• Expand the ROK economy and army – Korea was to be left defendable. This would enable the Americans to leave. This was a fundamental shift in military strategy.
• Remove the 7th Fleet from the Taiwan Straits – to avoid putting pressure on the mainland Chinese and to stop pushing them closer to the USSR. And to convince China that the USA was not violently supporting Taiwan.
• Threatened to use newly developed tactical nuclear weapons and also to attack Chinese bases. Moscow and Beijing considered whether the USA would use the weapons at all.

• Stalin’s death – his iron hold on power was gone and the successors fought for power. Thus, the Soviet govt. was willing to end this war in order to focus on internal problems. In the meantime, Malenkov signaled to the US that he was prepared to consider negotiations.
• ROK anger about the prisoners of war – Eisenhower was willing to force the POWs to go back to resolve the issue.
• Battlefield stalemate.
• The final agreement was made in silence. Lines were drawn on the map until both sides agreed. The UN prevailed. The prisoners were sent back. A sort of compromise.
• The ceasefire line was better defendable than the previous one – so the situation was stabilized.

• “This is just an armistice on a single battlefield on a global scale” – there are more battles to come.

• US forces: 54,000 killed, 103,000 wounded.
• ROK forces: 46,000 killed, 101,000 wounded.
• UN forces: 14,000 casualties

• Provoked US and NATO rearmament. This led to understanding that NATO should be a true military alliance. The attack created a necessary momentum for that. The US understood that its commitment lay in Europe.
• Rehabilitated Japan and West Germany.
• Saved the KMT in Taiwan by distracting the US and China.
• Committed US to ROK defence.
• Sowed the seeds of the Sino-Soviet Split. The Chinese understood that they were manipulated by Stalin. The frictions in the Western camp were on the contrary reduced.
• Militarised the Cold War but also defined the Cold War – neither side wanted to push the war too far.
• All in all, the war was a huge defeat for the communist forces.
• It caused the US to focus attention on Asia, not Europe alone. The borders in Europe became stabilized, but they were only beginning to stabilize in Asia. Korea merely chanced to be the battlefield.
• In Korea, the Americans revealed all insensitivity and arrogance in handling the local people. This was later repeated in Vietnam. South Koreans emerged from the war only concerned about personal survival – was there a victory of democracy? Rhee’s regime did not collapse because the UN forces stayed there, which was not the case in Vietnam. Political structure was created based on only one fact – hostility towards communism. Time showed that this alone was not enough.
• South Korea was defended when South Vietnam fell because geographically, it was easier to defend.
• From the Russian point of view, the invasion was an experiment. All convinced them that the US abandoned their puppet, so the USSR might try. The Soviets did not expect to elicit the response they elicited. But in any case, Kim’s attack was a case of unprovoked aggression. Moscow miscalculated the strength of American reaction from the outset.
• The UN suffered a setback on its ideals. While it fought on the territory of the South Korea, its ideals were upheld, but as soon as the crossing occurred, it was the American interests that dominated it. It was the beginning of the UN being dominated by the Cold War. The Americans at that time argued that since the Chinese govt. was illegitimate it was fine to overthrow it by rolling the Chinese back after they invaded.
• However, the Chinese too made a grave strategic blunder. They grossly underestimated the power of the US and invaded almost provoking a roll-back, which almost certainly must have killed them (China was still weak after the Civil War). In their pursuit after the fleeing Americans, they overextended their supply lines, thus making themselves even more vulnerable.
• The war drove China into economic and political isolation and made her an absolute dependent on the USSR for many years to come.
• However, despite the fact that communism failed to triumph ideologically, it (North Korea and China) earned respect in the eyes of the rest of the world for resilience and courage. China convinced the world that she was a power to be reckoned with and slowly started her ascent towards the status of a superpower.
• Taiwan was the unexpected winner. Should the Chinese not have invaded, the US would have left Formosa alone to fall to communism. Now, the attention became focused on Asia and the US declared it as the ground of containment.
• North Korea paid the highest price of all – to this day her people remain prisoners to an oppressive stagnating regime and economy. As the Chinese went on to repair relations with the West, North Korea refused to follow suit and her relations with her powerful neighbour became strained.
• The threat from the north never receded for South Korea. Rhee’s regime was deposed in 1960, but the oppressive military rule was maintained and the American military presence remained strong. However, during the Vietnam war, the South Korean economy was given a boost to take off. Now, South Korea is the model of democracy – a prosperous democratic capitalist country.
• The US was criticized for upholding such a regime as Rhee’s, the British especially were unhappy. However, would the communism be better? Rarely the world is offered a choice between an absolute evil and an absolute virtue. This was the case later in Korea as well.
• The USSR was anxious to remain strong in Europe and to keep China in subordination. For that, she made the PRC pay for aid. This contributed to the SSS later.
• Fifty years down the road, it seems that the war was worth fighting for the West.

• Hastings, Max. The Korean War. London: M. Joseph, 1987.
• Stueck, William Whitney. The Korean War: An International History. Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1995.