The Gulf War was a war in Asia, but it involved the USA. It had very little to do with WWII, unlike the other two wars and it was less connected with the Cold War. It is still rather recent incident to be analysed with any authority. There are too many unresolved questions remaining.

It is argued that the US did not intervene in the conflict to establish a new world order, but merely to resolve her own problems. Moreover, this particular conflict was important as it involved oil. So the US intervened and the conflict became a defining moment for the world order. The new order was already in the making for the past several years, along with the disintegration of the USSR and for that reason the US did not pay sufficient attention to the simmering conflict. In fact, the preoccupation of the rest of the world with its own problems gave Saddam an idea that his overture will pass unnoticed. It did not and this had important effects on the Eastern European states’ trying to reconstruct their economies, Japan’s sense of her international obligations, helped China integrate herself back into the international community and on the Middle Eastern disputes.

The major problem posed by the occupation of Kuwait was not one of ends: everyone agreed that Iraq was to withdraw. The question was how to do it? There were several measures available – diplomatic, economic sanctions, military force. Even as it was decided to use military force, further divisions occurred. Should air force be used?

Saddam was waging a media rather than a military conflict. CNN was transmitting undigested information and sending it to all corners of the world, influencing important decisions.

The deepest cause of the Gulf War was the fundamental instability of the Middle East. The question remains, why did it break out when it did and how it did. The major powers could only intervene because the Cold War was over. The combination of these two forces shaped the conflict. Older forces were not irrelevant, but the new forces served to precipitate the conflict. Let us look at the general developments at the ends of the Cold War, which shaped the developments, which in turn affected the war. The origins of a conflict, which got most of the countries on one side ought to be simple, otherwise, disagreements between the members of the coalition are unavoidable. The invasion of Kuwait was a clear-cut case of aggression and if international laws and the UN were to mean anything, it was to be stopped.


The End of the Cold War

The Cold War ended as the USSR overstretched itself as a global power. She failed as an experiment of communism. There are several reasons why the USSR collapsed.

The system was inherently flawed.

By mid-1970s the USSR felt she was in good shape. She had the initiative, the relations with the US were good and the peaceful coexistence worked. The relations with China were bad, but the relations with the US were improving to compensate for that. The success in the Third World also increased the power of the USSR and consequently made the USA anxious.

The USSR came to support wars of liberation – the USSR invested into the third world countries to woo groups and countries over to its bloc – sometimes she was successful, sometimes, not. The USA stumbled in Vietnam, and it helped the USSR to promote her cause. The USSR moved to the Middle East to establish alliances – especially in Iraq and Egypt. This was so easy because of the Israel conflict. The USSR used the conflict to cause trouble to the USA and supported the Arabs. As a result, Israel was pushed closer towards the USA and more aid was sent over by the 1960s. Seeing this, the Arabs, reduced support for the USA. After all, the Soviet aid was the only country to expect help from. So the USSR positioned herself as the bigger sponsor of the Arab nations.

American failure in Vietnam gave the USSR a chance to think that she could take initiative and lead the Third World. However, this did not work out. Most of the time, the Soviet allies (proxies) tended to be tougher than anti-communist forces. But the US allied herself with Israel, who was significantly stronger than the Arabs. This was an important choice. It was not possible to destroy Israel militarily and the huge military expenditure was a heavy burden on the Arab nations. In the meantime, Egypt, who was a Soviet ally, slowly drifted away to assume an independent role and was expelled from the Arab league. Syria did not go far in supporting the USSR. So in the Middle East the USSR lost out.

In Africa even successes turned out to be burdens. They were too expensive to support. In Asia, the USSR did not succeed either. There was intense feud with China, India tried to become a leader of the Non-Aligned movement, and only Vietnam could be counted as an ally.

Intervention in Afghanistan proved to be a fatal mistake. It cost the USSR even more than intervention in the Vietnam. It all started with Brezhnev’s Doctrine, which stated that the USSR would support any communist govt.. There were too many distractions. Czechoslovakia threatened to break away and was invaded. Yet, the Soviet policy statement remained unchanged. Highly educated people were increasingly impoverished and suffered under tight control. Despite these troubles, the USSR had to divert her attention to other countries.

Enforcing Brezhnev’s Doctrine was not a problem in East Europe because there was a long border with it and East Europe was tightly controlled. In Afghanistan, it was a different matter. Communist regime there was established in 1978. However, the ambition to develop it into an advanced socialist society was too far-fetched. Many Islamic peoples were worried about these developments. Also, it offered few opportunities for further movements – Islamic world was too divided to pay attention and to adopt communism. It was very near to disquiet north Pakistan. But it would surely alert the West. Strategically, it was in important position – near to important oil fields (hence the Western attention). Also, the West suspected that the USSR was trying to intimidate Pakistan.

The invasion was planned on the Christmas Eve. What was the reason for invasion? To exert the claim that the USSR was the driving force in the Cold War. To support Brezhnev’s Doctrine. To defend her own nuclear fields. She did not expect much backlash from the Islamic world torn by rivalries.

But the USSR could never recover from this mistake. The invasion did provoke an Islamic response. Sometimes the response was direct – e.g. Iraq sent in military assistance and offered her lands for military training. Many individuals volunteered themselves to the Islamic cause – mujahiddins. Thus, the attack provoked national and religious solidarity. The invasion provoked the backlash from the West – the enemy of its enemy became its friend. Western help was sent to Afghanistan. Weapons, and intelligence were sent in. Thus, the commitment of the USSR became enormous. The USSR had no credible local ally to support to explain her cause. The USSR could not pull out easily, as the conflict was on her border. Also, it would damage prestige and credibility. If the USSR was to back out, who would become the leader of the communist world?

Unlike the USA in Vietnam, the USSR did not have money. Now the Soviets were demoralized and the USA regained the sense of confidence, although in the 1970s it looked as though the USA was backing down.

Ronald Reagan was elected in 1981. He was elected on a promise that he would restore assertiveness and vigour to American position in geopolitics. He promised to restore American prestige after the Watergate, the Vietnam war and the Iran crisis. He promised to stop the USSR. This brought him popularity. Reagan came to act tough – ‘Evil Empire’ and challenged communism. He applied containment very aggressively. It was similar to a global application of a rollback.

So the USA went to prove that she was the leader of the liberal world and participated in wars of liberation. He tried to prove that communism was a failed idea. He embarked upon a big defence build-up, started an assertive foreign policy and renewed the American vigour. His assertions that the USA was the best, the strongest and the greatest were very loud and convinced Western World. Reagan meant to restore the American international and self image, which suffered after the Vietnam War. Reagan introduced Weinberger Doctrine – to prevent the USA from being compromised by home debates. It meant that there would be no military intervention unless the policy was to achieve military victory whatever it took. And there would not be military intervention unless the nation supported it. So, the US would only intervene if military outcome would be feasible, and if the war was clear-cut.

This did not mean that Reagan was picking fight with the USSR. Quite the contrary. He wanted to reinforce diplomacy with military strength. And he wanted to make victory more sure.

Regan embarked upon a military build-up to threaten the Soviet Union and put the Soviets on the defensive and make the USSR question her ability to wage any more wars. Thus, the USA spent much money on high technology to divert the Soviet funds to the military area from diplomacy, foreign policy and domestic policy. Reagan invested into a new SDI system, which would make the Russian nuclear arsenals expensive junk. On the one hand, all these posed an economic threat to the USSR, on the other – political danger for Reagan. The West thought that the very prospect of SDI would precipitate the confrontation and Europe would become the theatre, as the MRBMs would be stationed there. Moreover, fear of the nuclear weapons was already high and now Reagan was investing in nuclear build-up.

The only way in which the Soviets could respond was to portray the USA as a belligerent. Alternatively, the USSR could only build-up nuclear power and spent money researching a similar shield. However, this was a dangerous way to go. The USSR chose the first way. Reagan actually had his supporters – Margaret Thatcher, who prevented decoupling of the USA and Europe. She was the key supporter in new American policy of rebuilding herself.

This had fatal consequences for the USSR. The Soviet leadership was falling apart. Brezhnev was dying in the office. The weakness of the Soviet system was that there was no mechanism for proper succession. So while, the successors fought, Brezhnev was kept in power and precious time was lost. The next two successors stayed in the office for too short periods of time to adopt any meaningful policy. All they could do was to go with the flow and the military intervention in Afghanistan was reinforced.

All these left to dissent at home and abroad. This was further worsened by high levels of mass good public education. These people expected increase in economic growth, living standard etc.. The country was instead stagnating and frustration was building up. More and more criticism was coming up and could not be resisted. West undeniably prospered, but not the USSR, they enjoyed higher standard of living and GNP per capita. Dissent in the Soviet bloc began – shipyard strike by the Solidarity Union Movement in Poland (1970). The Red army did not and could not march in to crush the dissent. The example spread.

By 1984 the moral argument was well-balanced. Although Reagan did threaten the world, so did the USSR and these flaws became increasingly clear. The USSR agriculture was failing. The Cold War became a luxury, which the USSR could no longer sustain. The US increased military spending by $300 bil and annually increased by 3.3% GNP. Soviet military spending was $140 Bil, increasing by 29% of GNP. The USSR was devoting too much of economic product to military. It was clear that the West did not have to build walls to keep people in – the Berlin Wall was to keep the communists in, not the capitalists out.

Gorbachev tried to launch perestroika to cure the ills of the communist system. He wanted to rebuild the system itself, though introducing more glastnost and perestroika. He unleashed market forces and tried to disengage the USSR from the Cold War. He tried to head the forces of change instead of being swamped by them. It was a very brave move. Hard-liners opposed him thinking that he would destroy the USSR.

Gorbachev’s most important task was to make peace with Reagan so that the USSR did not have to compete with the USA for diplomatic influence and lead in the Arms Race. This would free up the money needed at home for perestroika.

He failed. Many summits with Reagan failed, as he wanted action, not talks. However, Reagan figured out that the USSR was trying to bail out to save her life – this was not active diplomacy, but active despair. Reagan demanded that Gorbachev tore down the Berlin Wall, thus taking the lead again.

Gorbachev reacted, although it might have been too late. He offered a withdrawal from Afghanistan. It was too late, as too much money was spent. East Europe, which became a liability at that time, was freed. Hard-liners were alarmed. This unleashed a chain reaction. 1989 – annuls mirabilis in Europe – the Warsaw Pact fell apart. Demonstrations in the streets deposed of govts. and the Soviets let it happen. People fled West. The USSR was a spent force.

Soviet allies outside Europe were angry and horrified. They were left alone. China was infuriated. Many Third World countries had to try to survive on their own. The USSR had to gather pieces. All these event resulted in uncertainties everywhere. What was to happen to the Cold War. The stalemate of the Cold War began to rumble. It was a necessary pre-condition for the Gulf War. The parties in the Gulf War were left without the support of the USSR. There was much uncertainty there. In fact, the uncertainties began when perestroika was undertaken. It became clear that it was dangerous experiment, which the USSR would hardly survive.

The whole world was watching the USSR and the crumbing of the Soviet Empire, so the build up of aggression in the Middle East was missed. The US was busy drawing up plans for her disengagement from Europe. Moreover, there was a forthcoming Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Paris in November. Proposals were being drafted for it to revive Western European Union, give more political strength to NATO, to revamp a European Community and to give it a defence role. Moreover, there was a general spirit of peaceful resolution of conflicts.

In the later years of the Cold War, there was more collaboration between the US and the USSR in resolving of the regional disputes within the UN. Had it not been for the collapse of the USSR, the USA would not have dared to come in. Thus, the Superpowers played a decisive role: one collapsed, thus freeing another one to intervene. The US could now free up the forces along the Iron Curtain and move them to the Gulf. Iran and Iraq

There was an Islamic Revolution in Iran. This was the most destabilizing factor in Iraq. Iraq is a Muslim country – it has a Shiite majority, almost unique in the Middle East – it set Iran apart from the rest of the Middle East. Also, the Iranians are one of the most ancient civilizations in the world and are Persians, not Arabs. For a long time, Iran was an American ally under Shah Reza Pahlavi, since 1953 coup. The USA installed that unpopular govt.. It was extremely undemocratic, ran a police state etc.. But it did not cause problems in the West, because it was seen as a strong loyal anti-communist ally.

Although Iran was a rich country, little of that money was pumped into the economy, which stagnated. The frustration with the regime and economic hardship was expressed in Islamic Revolution. Resistance crystallized around exiled fundamental clerics – these claimed they could do better than the existing regime because they were true to the old right fundamental. They advocated a return to pure Islamic fundamentals. Their target was the secular dictatorship. More and more people agreed with the criticisms. The clerics wanted to create a social revolution in Iran, to change the fundamental principles the govt. is founded upon. In 1979 the regime gave way and the Revolution took place. There was not consensus on what was to take place, but there was an agreement that the Shah was to go. The Iranian clerics (Khomeini) was the most suitable person to take the place of the old regime. Thus, a religious society was established.

Khomeini was exiled to France. The great majority of other Islamic states did not ally themselves with him and disliked him. These countries did not want fundamentalists like him around as he was likely to have undermined the credibility of their govts.. He changed the govt. and the society itself – its values, rules, legal codes etc.. Thus, Khomeini inspired a true revolution. Moreover, this revolution was aggressive and expansionist, as it aimed to spread across the world. Other govts. did not like the idea – they did not like to follow the codes of law, which were based on somebody else’s interpretation of Koran. Even though other countries were not prospering, did not agree to his ideas, which rejected all other alternatives. Khomeini targeted especially secular regimes that persecuted Shiites. The only other country where the largest percentage of population was Shiites who were persecuted – Iraq. Khomeini called Iraq a Muslim country of convenience – they did not truly embrace Islam to his thinking.

Initial clash was with the US – the American embassy workers were held hostage. This was a humiliation to Carter and cost him re-election. It also convinced the rest of the world that Iran was a threat and that she could conquer the surrounding countries. An attack on an embassy meant war. It was true that all the Arab countries tended to be rich and corrupted. So this was a very combustible material for Iran. Iran shared a long border with the USSR, Chechnya’s unhappy Muslim population, so both the USSR and the Arab countries perceived it as a threat. Nevertheless, Iraq was the main target, with secular Saddam’s govt. that persecuted Muslims. Iran was a natural creation – old Persia, but Iraq was an artificial creation.

Apart from a long border, Iran and Iraq shared rich oil reserves. They were historically different. Iraq was one of the cradles of civilization. They depended on the Persian Gulf for communication with the rest of the world and trade. Iran claimed leadership of Shi’ites of the Middle East.


Secular Tyranny in Iraq

There were three Ottoman provinces, but they did not correspond territorially to Iraq. Iraqis are tribal populations, Shi’ite/Sunni division, but had very little unity. The territory was not united by the ancient will of the people. The territory was created by the British. The British established a protectorate on the place of the old Ottoman provinces. The people always lived there. The British put the provinces together, added oil rich land from Turkey for the convenience of administration and to give Iraq advantage in natural resources to ensure prosperity. However, they put together people who did not want to be together and started all the mess.

Initially, Iraq was a hope of the Arab world. Ba’th party in 1958 came to power in Iraq. It adopted different ideas and worked towards modernization and Arab unity. For the young Arabs, this was an important party, as it promised to revive the power of the Arab civilization, which was battered by the Mongol invasion. With oil modernization and improvement were possible. All the administrative, political and economic structures were to be re-structured and modernized and industrialised and were to be implemented across the entire Arab world. This was the pride of the Arabs. However, the Sunni minority held 80% of all the high-ranking jobs. Iraq offered an alternative path to spiritual salvation.

In fact, Egypt and Syria tried to unite into United Arab Republic, but it did not work out. Their economy progressed, but politically and diplomatically it was a failure. There was no cohesive action as a bloc, because many elites realized that there would be too much competition for power in a large union. Thus, this aspiration remained popular only among the intellectuals. Feudal political culture was not easy to transform into impersonal bureaucracy in the Arab world (it was a problem in Europe and took many centuries to overcome).

Politics in Iraq became violent, tyrannical. Saddam came to power amidst this mess in July 1979 – was elected. Saddam continued to develop economy of the country and was a charismatic leader. Hussein was a good leader – ruthless, efficient, coming from an influential family. He was also in favour of violence, if it helped to advance his goals. At first he was not feared. His politics rested on clan politics and influence, not democratic process. This was not uncommon, especially in the past. He denounced Israel, like everyone else in the Arab world, but did not do much about it, gave little support. He focused on regional aspirations instead – oil, territory, influence. His main ally was the USSR, who supplied him with weapons, to support his main policy – arms build-up, and creation of weapons of mass destruction. His trouble was Sunni minority. He used them as the elite. He ran a police state, but it did not bother anyone until Iranian revolution.

Iran became a big threat after the Iranian Revolution. She represented what Khomeini despised. Persecuted Shiites, who were a majority (the only state in the Middle East!), tried to develop his own power, not the Muslim society, she also gave power to the Sunni, who were persecuting the Shiites. Moreover, there were several holy Shi’ite shrines on Iraqi territory – e.g. Karbala, Najaf. Saddam Hussein was a nationalist. Iran felt that the strong military power of Saddam hindered his ideal of spreading her model of revolution across the Arab world. Furthermore, Iran gave support to Kurds in Iraq in their long-standing goal of struggle against the central govt. and to underground Shi’ite movement and to terrorist acts against more prominent govt. officials.

These only provoked Saddam to harden anti-Shi’ite measures. He also came to realize that the only way to cope with the threat Iran posed was to deliver a pre-emptive strike. Iran was disorganised and confused, and yet, threatening and angry. Hussein decided to make use of Iranian confusion and strike unexpectedly to undermine Khomeini’s credibility and hopefully, to topple his govt.. It was decided to deliver an attack along the Tigris border, as it was a contested territory, which was an important waterway. He hoped to capture it and create enormous difficulty for the Khomeini’s govt.. But Khomeini used the war to strengthen his cause and hence his leadership.

This war was extremely ill-timed for Saddam – he would not want to fight it out of imperial motives. At the time he became the President, Iraq enjoyed economic prosperity because of high prices on oil. So Saddam would rather carry out his ambitious development programmes, which war could only put at risk and worsen Saddam’s domestic standing. So after the Shah was overthrown in January 1979, Saddam did not try to take advantage of the internal disorder in Iran to enlarge his own empire. In fact, he was actually trying to placate the new regime in Iran. However, Iran inspired Shi’ite unrest inside Iraq and Saddam had to clam down in Da’wa Party and supported Iranian separatist elements. In southern Iraq, the unrest was especially severe and Saddam denied access to Shi’i holy shrines. As these measures failed, Saddam invaded Iran.

The war began and unfortunately, the Iraqi army was weak and could not capture the territory quickly enough. And as he hoped, a limited war did not suffice to convince the revolutionary regime to desist from attempts to overthrow him. Less than half of the Iraqi army took part in the invasion. Saddam was not interested in destroying Iran or in conquering it. His army lacked skill to launch a massive attack, like the Koreans did. Instead, they created a stalemate. Iran lost much troops and equipment, but managed to rally popular support. Even those who did not support the Iran regime, rose to the occasion to support their country. Iran could wear Iraq by sheer numbers.

For Iraq, the war became a great strain on the economy because of its costs. Iraq realized that she could not keep the war going. So Hussein used the weapons of mass destruction – chemical weapons – at cities and armies in order to terrorise the Iranians into surrendering. When rebellion started at home, Saddam used the chemical weapons at home population. This ruined his own reputation at home. His international position was condemned – people abroad saw him as a threat and he became a notorious figure.

All Saddam succeeded in doing was to buy time and help Khomeini convince the world of peaceful intentions of his revolution. Yet, it was the war he could not win. Iran threw all her people at war. An all-out confrontation began, huge costs on both sides were incurred. Iraqi revenues were drained and development eroded. His regime became even more brutal, missile and chemical attacks were common and made him notorious. He was not prepared to tolerate any dissent and was prepared to do anything to preserve his regime based on his clan. The Iraqi population was stuck with such a leader. All the Iraqi oil was used to feed military costs. Focus was shifted to a military build-up, not economic development.

It was hoped that after the cease-fire there would be a shift towards moderation in the Middle East. The 1980s were the most violent years. Yet, the turbulence triggered a painful realization that military forces were a bad instrument in conflict-resolution. The region began to move gradually towards a more orderly system, based on growing readiness to come to terms with its diversity. Iran tried to project an image of peacefulness and restore diplomatic relations with both the East and the West and especially, the USSR.

The failure of the Arabs to conquer Israel also contributed to pacification in the region. Israel sought to impose its own solution on the Arab world. In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon in a preventive move against PLO’s formidable military build-up. Sharon also dreamt of a new world order, as the invasion would allow him to capture the entire West Bank and to eliminate PLO as a factor. However, the operation lost any sense of purpose. The operation collapsed and drove the Middle East into an even greater sense of moderation, as the Israelis lost faith in the efficiency of military methods to solve the larger conflict. The Palestinians embarked on the intifada. Seeing that it was failing, they opted for a more moderate stance in order to win international sympathies and even recognized Israel. Intifada showed Israel the high costs of occupation and brought about Arab-Jewish compromise. Intifada also exhausted its participants on both sides. Also, world interest in the Arab-Israel conflict and focused on the growing turmoil within the USSR and Eastern Europe. The warmer great power relations left less room for maneuver for Arabs and Jews. Moreover, the USSR was prepared to sacrifice her interests in the Middle East and reduced military and economic aid. Moreover, the radicalism of the Middle East did not go well with the peaceful image the USSR was trying to project. Also the disintegration of ungodly communism proved to the Arabs that the way of godliness and of piety was the right way and took steps towards liberalizing their systems. Hence the reduction of militancy in the Arab camp. The Arab camp was too divided to be strong. The US govt. showed signs of irritation with Israel and raised questions about the legitimacy of her position in the East Jerusalem. Israel was no longer an important strategic asset to the USA in the ending of the Cold War, so the US considered reducing aid, which would have created difficulties for Israel settling the Russian Jews who were fleeing en masse.

There was an element in the entire complex equation, which could offset this general stability – it was unpredictability of Iraqi policy. Since the spring of 1990, Saddam Hussein had been sending confusing signals of both extremism and moderation. In 1979 he hosted a conference in Baghdad to expel Egypt from the Arab League, but during the course of the war, he tried to get it back into the League in order to get some military support. For the reasons of personal survival, Saddam was accommodative towards Israel and in 1982 he participated in Fez Arab summit, which tacitly accepted a two-state solution of the conflict. He even voiced public support for peace negotiations between the Arabs and Israel. This moderation was sustained into post-war period.

Saddam risked a death threat by fighting that war and wanted no further instabilities to his regime by furthering foreign entanglements. He was already facing a daunting task of reconstructing Iraq to prove his subjects that the war was won. He even promised to democratize his govt. and hold free elections. Price controls were lifted and there were attempts to attract foreign investment, there were also attempts to privatize the economy. He no longer engaged in radical rhetoric and cooperated with the Arabs and concluded non-aggression pacts with them and tried to prevent hegemony of Iran. He also worked with Egyptian President Mubarak towards shielding of PLO from Syrian wrath, this signaled his growing acceptance of Israel.

Both saw Iranian revolution as the greater threat, both helped Iraq in various ways, as did the Soviets. They hoped to contain the Iranian revolution. In the case of Arab govts., they did what they wanted, not what their population wanted, but their population tended to support the Revolution.

Both saw Hussein’s regime as brutal, but both hoped engagement could mollify it. France took lead in courting Saddam. It was judged that the future lay with the Arabs. It would also soften France’s relations with her own Muslim North African colonies. Iraq was the most promising of all the Arab countries. Egypt was leaning towards the USA and with Syria, there were problems because of the Christian community in Lebanon. France and Iraq concluded agreements, by which Iraq would sell ¼ of her oil to France and France would sell arms to Iraq. The Western govts. were fearful of religious fanatism in Iran and saw Iraq as a counter-weight, so France supported Iraq even more after the Iranian revolution.

The British were more circumspect. They were wary of Iraqi ruthlessness and spare use of force. However, Britain was eager to support Iraqi domestic reconstruction, hoping that lucrative offers would distract Saddam from militarism. So Britain became Iraq’s third largest trading partner.

The US was also convinced that Saddam’s regime discarded its past militancy. The US was friendly towards Iraq especially because she was Iran’s enemy. The US was still bitter about the hostage crisis. The US granted Iraq credits to buy her agricultural produce. During the war, the US sent intelligence information to Iraq. The Iranian-Contra crisis (when it was discovered that Reagan administration was selling arms to Iran in return for release of hostages held by pro-Iranian groups in Lebanon), the US became even more willing to support Iraq against Iran.

The American friends in the region – Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan also viewed Iraq in the similar light.

Both worried about Iraq’s build-up, and the use of chemical weapons as well as his brutality towards the Kurds. Both however believed that Iraq could be turned to moderate posture. Moreover, Italian and American banks lent large sums of money to finance the war and wanted to get it back, so it was necessary to maintain friendly relations with Iraq. But opted to engage Hussein, sent him an unintended signal. There was a scandal over such large lending in BNL (Italian Bank). Aziz (Iraqi foreign minister) accused the US of alleging bribery and corruption in Iraq. The Americans wanted to maintain normal relations and told Aziz that no harm to Iraq was intended and the US promised more loans. It was a test to the US. After that Saddam started thinking that he could away with whatever he did. Saddam thought that others sold him weapons because they wanted to get more money. The agricultural loans were misused by Saddam to finance his military build-up. Many agricultural products received were bartered to the USSR in exchange for weapons. This was discovered in the US, but instead of cutting further loans, Baker proposed to fight corruption elements. Loans continued and attempts to purchase military technology by Iraq were ignored.

The war made him a desperate man. The war enraged his people against him and made him ready to do anything to stay in power, which was threatened from within.

The world was disappointed when the war ended. The two belligerents did not destroy each other.

The origins of the conflict were simple enough to allow all the countries to function together with minimum disagreements. The international law could only function if the majority and the most powerful states who signed them abided by them and this was the case. Also, this conflict was a regional conflict that did not involve the superpowers and it allowed the UN to function as intended.

Treasury was depleted, huge debts were incurred and oil prices – depressed, so the source of income suffered. The mechanism that was supposed to control oil prices – OPEC – was deeply divided and the prices were plunging. Some of the OPEC members wanted oil price to go down – to increase demand for their oil. However, others, like Iraq, wanted oil to remain expensive, because they did not have the money to increase production and wanted to sell existing stock of oil at as high as price as possible. Saddam needed money to support the minority group that supported him, he realized that without their support, he would lose out. There was social unrest in the country and people were frustrated with his regime. There were frequent attacks on Hussein and his regime from within and from without. Hussein’s only assets were – a large and an experienced army, a long list of complaints – both his own and Arab complaints, which he could capitalize on. His country was well-developed economically and social and could act as a model for the Arab world, but he chose to attack Iran to achieve his own selfish ends. Nevertheless, there were grievances in the Arab world and he knew them and knew what to promise people to get them to support him.

In 1990 Saddam returned to the violent methods against Israel and rallied the Arabs for his cause. This was a smoke screen behind which he designed aggressive moves against Kuwait, by which he hoped to extract money for domestic reconstruction. Such an aggression was also due to his growing desperation. He was almost paranoiac about pre-empting any potential dissent. He was questioned by the military leadership about his ability to lead Iraq to victory in Iran-Iraq war, he survived only by a clever political maneuver. There were multiple attempts on his life, one from his elite bodyguard force. Moreover, Iran was refusing to negotiate with Iraq directly and Saddam could not pull out of this destructive war and had to support a large army. The problem of the lost generation was mounting. Thus, even a victory would not suffice. Saddam needed money and distraction for the people. The clash he initiated with Syria in Lebanon, brought no result. The disintegration of communism deprived Saddam of a valuable ally. The overthrowing of dictators made his nervous, especially, when the media described him as a tyrant. He asked that the residual American forces leave the Gulf, even though they were serving essentially Iraqi cause. Migration of Russian Jews to Israel strengthened it too much to Saddam’s liking.

There was a confrontation with the West. Saddam arrested of Bazoft (a London journalist) near military complex in Baghdad. He was then executed. To the West it demonstrated futility of any attempts at coercion. Saddam often used purges to stay in power. However, this time round his victim was not and Iraqi. He hoped to demonstrate to the West his determination to survive without a full confrontation. The West was determined to subvert his programme of nuclear weapons by stopping imports of essential parts. The US issued a warning about Iraq aspiring to become another nuclear power and this was her attempt to toughen stand on Iraq, however, Bush chose détente and trade over this. There was a debate with regards to implementing the harder line and National Security Policy adviser decided that there was no reason to change policy. The political measures could affect the conduct of business. Nevertheless, it was decided in May not to proceed with the second half of the $1 bil loan guarantee, but the Senate decided against the use of ‘food weapon’ against Iraq. The industrial and the agricultural lobby was interested in close relationship with Iraq. Iraq was also becoming increasingly wary of an Israeli strike designed to destroy his weapons before they were fully developed. The West was increasingly worried, but individual govts. preferred to maintain good relations, as they could not succeed and would lose contracts and influence with Iraq. In fact, Britain was eager to prove that there was no anti-Iraq campaign going on. Britain already broke relations with Syria and Egypt because of terrorism and did not want to alienate another Middle Eastern country.

The Cold War was ending, the USSR and world communism were collapsing. Old stalemates were now in motion. The world was concerned with other things than Iraq, apart from Iraq oil. Iran remained the general focus of concern. It bothered the Americans more than Iraq – after all they knew how to negotiate with secular govts..

The oil market was in confusion. The USSR had more oil than any other country and confusion in the USSR threw the whole world in confusion. Should that oil disappear from the market, the world would suffer a severe energy crisis.

The Arab world was even more divided and frustrated than usual. They realized they could not fight with Israel, and started doing their own thing. PLO launched an intifada, but it did not bring about significant results. Paradoxically, despite having larger population than Israel, they could not do anything about it – there was much frustration and divisions.

All these things contributed to the war and needed just a trigger.

Despite all these loans Saddam was running out of money and the West did not know how to resolve this. Increasingly, the issues connecting Iraq to the West were about credit. Eventually, the West decided to loan enough to pay for the existing debts. Baghdad did not stir to repay. The USSR and France, major weapons suppliers observed that the bulk of their loans was used for military build-up and they became reluctant to finance another instability in the region. Iraqi economy was in an awful state and the damage of the war was enormous. Iraq’s oil revenues barely covered the military budget. Such a situation required introduction of tighter controls and removing 2 mil of immigrant workers. However, pre-war prosperity caused people to have high expectations, so current situation was an especially severe disillusionment. With oil being in the hands of the govt. there were few chances for creation of a strong private sector. Should his state be declared bankrupt, Saddam’s vulnerability would increase.

In the meantime OPEC lowered the prices on oil (in fact it was economically inevitable) and worsened Saddam’s chances for recovery. Saudi Arabia was disadvantaged by such a decrease and disregarded all the quotas, since she could produce oil cheaply to regain losses. This drove prices even lower. OPEC negotiated and restored the complex system of quotas and prices. The price remained low. Kuwait and United Arab Emirates, who had a lot of cheap oil refused to cooperate.

Saddam Hussein decided to use military to conquer Kuwait. He issued multiple explanations – that he wanted to eliminate the last traces of Western colonialism in the Middle East, that Kuwait was a part of Iraqi empire in the past, which was cut off by the British in order to weaken the Iraqis. This was an old theme, so Saddam did not even have to become inventive.

There was a combination of two things: oil prices and money: OPEC, Iraq and Kuwait. There was a long-standing Iraqi claim to Kuwait – they claimed that Kuwait was their territory. The Arabs and the Western world were ambivalent about the situation. Kuwait was the least popular among the Arabs – she had much oil, but used it for her own needs, not for the needs of the Arab world. Standards of living there were high and other Arab people hated them for it. The West disliked Kuwait for its control of the oil.

Kuwait was carved out by the British, because that territory was ruled by a dynasty of families. Kuwait almost fully constricted Iraq’s access to the sea and Iraqi ships had to pass by Kuwait’s territory. Moreover, Kuwait had much oil. Iraq thus claimed that Kuwait actually belonged to them, as a part of Ottoman empire. The islands of Warba and Bubiyan were especially contended – they sat on huge oil deposits and controlled navigation in the Gulf of Persia. Their claim was never recognized. Saddam did not emphasise the historical argument too much prior to the invasion and did not reinstate his claims thus failing to win any crumbs of credibility with the West, as his was looked like a mere act of aggression.

Clearly, the aggression was not for historical or nationalist leaders, but for economic. In 1990, Saddam pressed the Gulf states – Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to forgive his debts. He claimed that he fought that war for their own benefit – to protect them from the onset of the Islamic radicalism. He then informed Prime Minister of Jordan and Egyptian President Mubarak that he needed additional funds for that war. He also tried to convince the Saudis to persuade the other members of the OPEC not to exceed the production quotas. But instead, Kuwait and UAE continued to exceed their quotas. Thus, an immediate change in UAE’s and Kuwait’s policy became his priority. During the summit of OPEC ministers in Geneva in May 1990, Saddam stated that continuation of exceeding one’s quota meant giving too many benefits to the West and served Israel and meant a declaration of war on Iraq. Kuwait and UAE were unmoved by this proclamation. Saddam demanded that Kuwait contributed $10 bil to Iraq or reduced production and both propositions were rejected. There were several warnings issued in the next few days. On the 10th of July there was a meeting between Iraq, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Kuwait with regards to oil production. Quotas were agreed on, but Saddam did not trust Kuwait and indeed, two days later, the meeting was contradicted in Kuwait – the Kuwaitis only intended to stick to the agreement for two months.

This left Saddam extremely frustrated. He took to actions.

The war started very rapidly.
• 15th of July – Iraqi deployment begins and by the 19th 35,000 men were deployed 10 to 30 miles from the Kuwaiti border. Together with the military build-up a diplomatic warfare began.
  
• On the 16th of July – Iraq complains to the Arab League that Kuwait deliberately depressed the oil prices to the detriment of Iraq. He also threw in that the territory belonged to Iraq. Iraqi foreign minister Aziz demanded that OPEC’s quotas are to be followed. Kuwait was accused of robbing Iraq. Other Arab states were called upon contributing more to the Iraqi cause. Kuwait was further accused for infringing upon the Iraqi territory at the time when Iraq was fighting against the Zionists and the West.
  
• On the 17th of July Hussein threatened Kuwait saying that she secretly drilled into Iraqi oil fields and was undermining Iraq. These threats were not new, but now, large military forces were deployed and ready to invade. Previous demands were re-instated. Again, this was not new, but now all these were made public.
  
• On the 18th Kuwaiti Cabinet met and decided that appeasement on their part will only make demands increase over time. However, Kuwaiti leadership remained complacent, although it did recognize that military action could not be ruled out. Still, it was assumed that military action would be limited. Kuwait expressed strong indignation about Iraqi behaviour to the Arab League. They called an emergency Gulf Co-operation Council meeting in order to get Arab League fully involved. The League chose Mubarak as mediator.
  
• On the 24th of July Hussein met with Mubarak, who was not quite qualified. Mubarak observed that Hussein needed some money to reconstruct economy and constrain internal rebellion in his society. Mubarak thought that Iraq can be bought. To him, Iraq denied the rumours about the build-up. There was no discussion of Kuwaiti issue. Mubarak told the Kuwaitis that Saddam did not intend to invade.
  
  

17th of July – US issued a warning that she will defend her friends and the President addressed Iraqis directly. Bush was experienced in foreign policy and knew what to do. So he expressed his stand strongly. On the 20th the US made it known to the rest that her intelligence observed the military deployment. Bush openly said that he would defend his Gulf allies.

There were more meetings afterwards – the Arabs tried to convince the US to take a lower profile. UAE was wary of the threats and asked the US to supply 2 KC-135 aircrafts and more naval support, but then UAE claimed that it was actually sending a political signal to Hussein as it was paving way for foreign troops to intervene in the region. Hussein met US ambassador on the 25th of July, and mixed signals were sent to both sides – Hussein indeed complained about foreign troops. He was also offended by this, as he felt the US was threatening him and supporting Kuwait. The US denied such allegations. The Americans were willing to support Kuwait, at stake were higher oil prices. Both sides insisted that they wanted to resolve the conflict by peaceful means. On the 27th of July – Mubarak prompted Bush to warn Hussein not to attack, but ensured him the US wanted better relations. To Mubarak, Saddam gave a pledge not to use force against Kuwait. Saddam concluded that the Kuwaitis were scared and just needed a bit more pressure. Washington and London began to think that the crisis abated. They were willing to believe that Saddam sent all the forces to the border to get them away from the centre so that they did not stand in the way of resolving problems. It was assumed that the crisis would end with Kuwaiti’s contribution.

On the 27th of July Saddam’s forces of about 100,000 men were poised on the joint border. The British still thought that it was intimidation, rather than a preparation for an actual attack. Mubarak kept encouraging the US to keep low profile. The US sent a message promising friendship. Yet, despite there being an opportunity for discussion, Baghdad did not tone down its demands. The Emir of Kuwait was reluctant to make a concession to Iraq. The US found out about the greater concentration of troops. Yet again, they found an explanation for this behaviour. At the same time, there was a meeting with OPEC and Iraq managed to get an agreement on firm enforcement of quotas. But Saddam did not believe those promises.

On the 28th of July Saddam again accused Kuwait of drilling his oil and demanded a $10 bil compensation, meanwhile moving forward his troops. The US observed that the force was disproportionate to the aim of bluffing. Bush spoke to King Hussein, but the latter refused to believe. The Arabs expected that Saddam would pull back once the islands were secured. Washington could do little to convince the Arabs. Its coercive options were constrained and in anticipation of the Jeddah meeting the Arabs did not want the US intervention as it could undermine its success. Without ground troops the US could not send support into the area. Economic sanctions, which the Congress was pressing, were unlikely to have any effect, as trade apart from agricultural loans was small and the loans were due to expire soon. Moreover, the administration still wanted to use Saddam’s help in countering terrorism. It was agreed to end economic aid, but how could it affect a regime that used chemical weapons against its own people? Defence obligations were unlikely to have been approved by the Congress. All these considerations only reinforced Saddam’s belief that the US would remain passive should he invade Kuwait.

So at the Jeddah meeting Saddam was as arrogant as ever. There was no mediator present. Kuwaiti delegation refuted all the allegations and refused to appease Saddam, they only agreed to write off their war-time loans, but in return asked for settlement of long-standing Iraqi-Kuwaiti border. Ibrahim of Iraq was enraged and called off the summit and left Jeddah.

In late July – early August the US was in a predicament as she wanted to warn the Kuwaitis that Saddam was serious, but on the other hand, she did not want to provoke a crisis. Both countries thought that they had more time. The Kuwaitis planned to go to Baghdad on the 4th of August to continue the negotiations. The Iraqi ambassador kept repeating to the US that Iraq was not planning to attack. In the meantime, the Iraqi troops moved inside the Kuwaiti border.

However, nobody believed that Iraq would attack, after all, before 1990 Saddam did not have such an intention. Even serious military planning is sometimes used to create a necessary political atmosphere. It is not known if Saddam would have resorted to such an extreme measure had not the economic situation in Iraq been so bad. However, when Saddam initiated the build-up process in July, he was already clear that most likely it would end by conquering Kuwait, he did not want a limited war. Everyone thought it was a solvable dispute and both sides were just stepping up pressure. The Arab states, especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia wanted to buy Saddam off. They did not want to start a civil war. The Americans agreed to all the above and it sent mixed signals.

Hussein made up his mind very late. Everyone else acted on their hopes for the best – they all hoped that their best case scenarios would work out. At 1 am, on the 2nd of August, Iraqi army invaded Kuwait. 140,000 troops crossed the border, led by 3 Republican guard divisions and special forces.

The objectives of the war: to capture and kill royal family, to install puppet govt., to control Kuwait’s oil and wealth. Saddam hoped to solve his own problems and to emerge as a regional power. Right from the start it was a war about oil. Iraq wanted to keep the prices up and wanted to improve domestic situation.

The islands were attacked. Fighting was over in 18 hours, but Emir escaped and Kuwaitis did not call on Iraq to help them, but started to fight in resistance. Now, Iraq could not say that it was liberating people oppressed by the ruling dynasty. Kuwait requested for help, but the US could not send it immediately – she did not have deployments nearby.

Saddam hoped that once the whole of Kuwait was swallowed, no Arab country would dare to ask for American support. Saddam’s negotiations were a mere smoke screen to distract attention from the preparations – he meant to invade right from the start. Iraq faced a dilemma – what would it do now? The key factor was how the rest of the world would react.

Could the USA have done more to prevent the invasion? The US and the British govts. had to take their cue from the Arab govts., they could not act unilaterally. Kuwait was wary about being seen too close to Washington to ask for its direct intervention – so she failed to derive any deterrent effect from such a relationship. The US was locked between her desire to prevent the conflict and to keep good relations with Iraq. Saddam was also conscious about the possibility of the American intervention, but he tried to avoid it by lulling the US by promises.

How would the world respond to the military conquest of Kuwait? The Kuwaitis could not put up a successful defence, but they did create problems for the Hussein by the entire royal family getting away. The royal family then called for help. The US responded by Desert Shield – which involved several military, diplomatic and political steps to cause Hussein move out. However, the move was controversial and had many flaws, which allowed Hussein to avoid the war. Nevertheless, Saddam did not move out and the US waged a war all to one purpose – to make him withdraw. There were many disagreements about the operation, but one thing everyone agreed on – the matters cannot stay that way. Diplomacy

Saddam could not annex Kuwait, nor could he maintain a permanent military presence there. Instead, he sought to establish hegemony over Kuwait, ensuring complete subservience to his wishes. He tried to portray in the media the overthrow of the Kuwaiti dynasty and his intervention as a temporary measure, but the dynasty survived and told the whole world what happened. Kuwaitis resisted the invasion – and it sent Saddam a signal that his puppet regime stood no chance of surviving. The war dragged on.

Saddam Hussein felt that if he gave up Kuwait he would not survive personally. His power rested on force and if that force was broken, he would not survive. Indeed, his power base was extremely narrow and it needed power, which he supplied. If he had no power, his base would be torn apart from within.

Arab neighbours felt that if he kept Kuwait, their regimes will not survive. He would intimidate them.

Western opinion all wanted Kuwait restored, but were divided on how to best do it. Nobody accepted the current situation, although disagreed on the means. Many did not like Kuwait regime and system, but the situation was not about liking the regime, but about tolerating the use of force to invade countries and increase one’s power.

The Soviets were conflicted about the whole mess. However, increasingly, Gorbachev believed that Hussein should withdraw from Kuwait. However, the hardliners in the Soviet govt. felt that the USSR should not support the West simply because she never supported the West. So the USSR confused the situation.

There were the Arabs – they offered an Arab solution. It meant no American military intervention – in effect, this idea was instilled by Saddam, who proposed that there should be no more foreign troops in the Middle East. Now it was propagated by the King of Jordan and Mubarak. They wanted to suppress the news and public references to the invasion, fearing that they might cause Saddam to lose face and make him desperate and dangerous. The Arabs then demanded that Saddam withdrew. Once he pulled out, it was promised to hold a mini-conference of the Arab states to discuss Iraqi demands. The more determined the US was to intervene, the more desperate the Arabs became. But Hussein was reluctant to give up Kuwait. Jordan was unwilling to support the rest of the Arabs because it was too economically dependent. Also, the Arabs wanted to talk only as long as Hussein was to pull out, but he did not intend to. Also there was no effective Arab union – it was not monolithic. The Saudis felt they were next on the list. The Syrians resented Hussein as well only slightly less than Israel – their insistence was that Hussein was defeated completely, and no compromises taken. So the agendas of the Arab govts. were too divided and too selfish and Hussein was too bent on keeping Kuwait. To increase these cracks, Saddam told different things to different representatives. Saddam also showed signs that he did not want to involve the Western powers. This was done in order to buy time and cushion himself from further pressure, at the international level. However, he refused to talk about any concessions or even about the restoration of the Kuwaiti dynasty and refused their presence at the proposed mini-conference. Although Kuwait was unpopular in the Middle East, her fate gave the rest the glimpses of their own fates and they thought that they had to deal with the aggression somehow. The gap between the Arabs and Saddam was too wide to breach and immediate withdrawal from Kuwait was not possible. Arab solution got nowhere.

Westerners: vital interests and how to define them. Many understood that the West was considering using the military power because the war involved oil. Nevertheless, they agreed that having Kuwait oil would give him too much power. It was feared the Saudi Arabia will be next in line. Some believed that force should not be used, but only economic sanctions to force Hussein give up Kuwait. Also, the UN Charter prohibited one country to attack another one. It was a clear-cut case of aggression. Saddam’s action had no legitimacy whatsoever. The West used it as an excuse and to some it was the actual concern and it actually acted as a glue that put the coalition together. Three conditions ensured pressure on Iraq: American leadership, cooperation with the USSR and close involvement of the UN. Some objected saying that if this particular resolution was to be upheld, why not try to uphold all. The counter argument was that the countries should try to uphold it in as many places as possible. Small countries insisted that the Charter is upheld, in their own interest.

Immediately after the news of invasion were broken, the USA demanded withdrawal from Kuwait. The US also started preparing a SC resolution in order to act through the UN. Measures were taken to deny the access to economic assets by Iraq. Britain was of crucial importance as she had most links with the Gulf countries. The views of leaders of both countries were shaped by the failure of appeasement against Hitler. They then embarked upon convening an international meeting with the Arab countries. To all the countries present, the issue of oil and the influence over the world market that it gave Saddam and the potential threat to Saudi Arabia was more important than the conquest of Kuwait. However, the entire discussion was framed in terms of aggression against Kuwait. The measures discussed were mainly diplomatic or economic, but the possibility of a military intervention was considered too.

Soviets: new thinking vs. old aspirations. The hardliners used the war as an excuse to take over the power. And they drew a line between politics and military. The Soviets asked themselves a question – what is their aim in restructuring? Should they assert their own independent interest or should they follow the interest of the UN? Should the USSR continue to confront the US or should she search for a position of power in the UN? Why compromise future policy goals of the USSR to keep Saddam in power. The Russians had an internal debate and while it went on, no one was sure who would win and which direction the USSR will go. The US ambassador went to meet with Shevardnadze. After the Iran-Iraq war, the USSR forged links with Saudi Arabia and Iran as well as Kuwait. In fact, it was Moscow who first offered help to Kuwaitis in 1987 thus prompting the US to follow suit. However, in the current conflict, the USSR was in favour of a negotiated settlement and stressed the importance of economic sanctions. Like the USA, the USSR did not initially believe in serious intentions of Saddam. But in the current situation, the USSR saw Iraqi actions as an act of aggression too. The invasion provided the USSR with an opportunity to show that she could cooperate with the USA. The USSR called for an immediate arms embargo, and it was an important move considering the fact that the USSR was a chief supplier of Iraq. Some, however, felt that such a move (cooperation with the West) would mean that the USSR was ready to give up her status of the superpower (e.g. Evgeniy Primakov) and preferred to stress the Arab solution. In the meantime, Gorbachev made an appeal to Saddam in tougher language.

Iraq: personal survival of Hussein. All his staff were connected with him through that power and survival. So they stood up together.

On the 5th of August Bush stated that the US would not tolerate the situation – Saddam was told to get out. On the 3rd of August Gorbachev talked to Saddam personally and told him that the USSR would not back him, but will only help him to get out. Gorbachev wanted to get the point across to the US. These messages were not ambiguous. King Fahd on the 6th of August allowed the Americans to send in troops and station them on Saudi territory, although under normal circumstances he would never agree. Fahd’s fear of Hussein was too great and he had to protect himself. Without Saudi there would be no Gulf War, as it was an important American base in the war.

Saddam made his response just as clear – he formally annexed Kuwait on the 8th August. It was a defiant response – he was especially making a point that he was not leaving.

The Arab League declared that the annexation was illegal. Saddam hoped that Arab dislike of Kuwait would prevent them for standing up for Kuwait. Arab countries were angry with Hussein as he gave the US the excuse to flood their countries with their troops. They were dragged into that war against their wish – hence Arab resentment of Saddam.

Hussein quickly realized that he miscalculated. He tried to play a card that would have saved him, but he played it clumsily. He argued that he aimed to resolve the Palestine problem by attracting the American attention to it. This was a frustration in the Arab world and could work, but he demanded that he was allowed to keep Kuwait. If Saddam were to say that he would withdraw from Kuwait in return for the American solving the Israel issue. However, Hussein felt that he needed to present himself as a strong unrelenting man and refused to use the conditional clauses. He simply insisted that he would keep Kuwait.

The UN agreed with the rest. On the 2nd of August (within hours after the invasion) it passed Resolution 660, which demanded that Saddam withdrew immediately and unconditionally and invoked articles 39 and 40 of chapter 7. Otherwise, the UN threatened to use sanctions and call upon its members to enforce them. Four days later, Resolution 661 was passed. The UN authorised full economic sanctions, especially an embargo on oil exports, and excluding healthcare products. Since Iraq depended on oil trade for survival, economic sanctions could be very effective if implemented by everyone. Iraq was to be isolated and it would force it to withdraw. However, Iraq was not persuadable. Also there were breaches in the unified agreement and continued trading with Iraq. Jordan could not survive without Iraq. Thus, Iraq was criminalized. When Emir of Kuwait formally asked for help, the US and the other countries supported this attempt at self-defence, which gave them the right to enforce the resolution (the Article 51 about the right of self-defence was invoked).

Japan was dubious. Her exports to Iraq were running to $490 mil and to Kuwait – $670 mil. Iraq was indebted to Japan and repayment came in part in kind – in the form of oil exports. However, following the US was more important at the moment. Brazil also had important trade relations with Iraq – she exported cars, arms and services in return for oil. Almost half of her oil requirements came from Iraq and Kuwait. Pipelines for Kuwaiti and Iraqi oil were built through Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Stoppage of oil exports would mean a loss of revenue for them. However, for Saudi, security questions were more important, so she preferred to side with the USA.

Turkey agreed to follow suit as a member of NATO. Turkey was also aware that Iraq could stoke up Kurdish insurgency in the south-east of the country. But Turkey controlled Iraqi water supply through the dam on the Euphrates. With regards to the West, Turkey felt marginalized as a result of events in the Middle East and Eastern Europe. However, embargo was declared and the Iraqis stopped piping oil that could not be sold. So the profits for Turkey were lost anyway.

Hussein responded by annexation of Kuwait. The UN had no choice but to pass these resolutions. After all, if the UN could not use even words to reinforce its standing it was useless. However, there was a big difference between using words and acting on them.

Hussein did not react to the previous resolutions and on the 29th of November, Security Council passed a war Resolution 678. Iraq had until 15th January to comply fully with all resolutions. After that the member states were authorized to fight and to use all necessary means to uphold and implement them to restore international peace and security. It meant was if Iraq did not withdraw. Hussein was not going to.

The Russian support of the UN resolutions meant that the Russians had to become military involved. Russia and China did not want that. So there was only UN-directed war, not UN-led. The UN did not direct the war, but only authorized it. UN consensus made it possible to bring together the Western and Arab responses and to cooperate with the Soviets. This was to be a primarily a US military participation, but the UN gave grounds to other countries to stand by the American side. Sanctions provided the wedge for the deployment of military forces. It was believed that sanctions need force to back them. If sanctions did not work, the rest of the world had to demonstrate that they had means to step up pressure. After all, Hussein made his own intentions real by using military force and it provoked the like response.

UN actions prompted the Soviets and the French to push for a resolution to avert the war. They did not want the war to get out of control. The two pushed very hard to find peaceful solutions. The UN allowed them to work as a coalition in the UN to put pressure on the others. They felt that things needed to be worked out with Saddam directly, else the war would be inevitable. They tried all sorts of proposals, even linkage of Kuwait with Israel to resolve it all peacefully. All of them were rejected by Saddam. This ignited negative public opinion at home.

King Fahd announced that he was prepared to allow the American troops on his territory, thus opening the military option to more serious consideration.

In military terms, the USA had no adequate response to the Iraqi invasion as the armed forces were simply not in place and the US had nothing in the region capable of encountering Saddam’s army. There was Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) developed by Carter against the USSR, but now there were plans to use it in the Gulf, as it was seen that the main threat was emanating from there. At the start of the hostilities one squadron was sent to Saudi Arabia, but it was a rather symbolic gesture of solidarity than a practical one. A plan of deployment of American troops against was worked out and to execute it, it was required to send the US troops to Saudi Arabia. Such discussions opened on the 2nd of August, however, Saudi Arabia was reluctant. They were reluctant because they feared that the US would commit another symbolic gesture and this will only provoke an Iraqi pre-emptive strike, instead of really increasing the security of their country. So it was crucial this time to convince the Saudis that the Americans were serious. Indeed, a token approach did not interest Pentagon much this time round. The Americans, at the same time, also needed to be convinced that they could depend on the Saudis.

The US shared intelligence on the movement of Iraqi armed forces towards the Saudi border. Although the Saudi army was rather well-equipped, it was too small to resist the Iraqi forces. Thus, Bandar convinced the Saudis in high possibility of Iraqi aggression. Moreover, Bandar shared Pentagon’s plans about the deployment and it also served to convince the Saudis of seriousness of intentions. It was not a small matter to invite the American troops into an Islamic country, as their habits did not seem to honour the Islamic traditions. Nevertheless, King Fahd agreed.

The American strategy with regards to military, political and economic aspects of the response was starting to fall in place. Only then did Bush openly and publicly committed himself to liberate Kuwait.

Saddam tried to convince Saudi Arabia that all the movements of his troops towards the Saudi border were fabricated by the US to achieve her own selfish ends. Iraq issued a denial. He soon then cut off links of the American embassy. Disclaimers from Baghdad were mistrusted. In any case, the Administration was too busy considering options for an immediate strike. In the meantime, the Saudis were becoming increasingly ambivalent. They were worried that the US troops would not leave after everything was over. The deployments were decided on together with Saudi representatives to build more confidence. Bush’s personal commitment to Kuwait was stressed. It was also stressed that because of the economic measures adopted, increasingly desperate Saddam became more dangerous and unpredictable. Saddam’s large expenditure on weapons as well as the fate of Kuwait did much to convince Fahd completely. The only concern was that the deployment could become very protracted. After that, the deployment was quick. Since the initial deployments were especially vulnerable, information about them was kept in strict secret. The plans were to deploy 250,000 troops by the 1st of December. A line in the sand was drawn.

Once Saudi Arabia agreed to have troops on her territory, there was no going back. Syria also supported the American move, as she hated Saddam since the 1960s, when he engineered a rift between Syrian and Iraqi Ba’th branches. Syria vied for the leadership in the Arab world and competed with Saddam. Prior to the crisis, Syria’s regional standing was at a particularly low ebb. Her protector, the USSR, was in ruins, her presence in Lebanon was challenged by Saddam’s protégé, and Syrian economy was in shambles. Now, was his chance to raise to prominence. Syria agreed to contribute troops and stated that it would not mean a foreign presence in the region. Syria also wanted to join the winning side.

Mubarak was driven into anti-Iraq coalition by similar reasons. He wanted to join the winning side. Siding with the US was more promising economically. Also, Saddam cheated Mubarak diplomatically over the promise not to invade Kuwait and Mubarak felt humiliated. Saddam’s support of the Arab Co-operation Council was seen as an attempt to isolate Egypt in the Arab world. Egypt also promised to contribute some troops (a total of 20,000).

King of Jordan and Yasser Arafat were criticized for their support of Saddam. They did not support the American intervention and tried to diffuse the crisis. They tried talking to Saddam personally and dissuading him from continuing and escalating the hostilities.

The UN Security Council responded by issuing resolution 662 – which rejected the annexation and demanded that Iraq withdrew and called upon all the states not to recognize this annexation and to refrain from any action or dealing that might be interpreted as an indirect recognition of the annexation.

The Arabs had a summit, during which it was decided to uphold the Resolution and the agreement provided for another dispatch of troops as a part of the multi-national force for confronting Iraq. Iraq was a member and insisted that the question of Kuwait is avoided, instead, the issue discussed should be the question of the American threat.

Saddam tried to convince Saudi Arabia that all the movements of his troops towards the Saudi border were fabricated by the US to achieve her own selfish ends. Iraq issued a denial. He soon then cut off links of the American embassy. Disclaimers from Baghdad were mistrusted. In any case, the Administration was too busy considering options for an immediate strike. In the meantime, the Saudis were becoming increasingly ambivalent. They were worried that the US troops would not leave after everything was over. The deployments were decided on together with Saudi representatives to build more confidence. Bush’s personal commitment to Kuwait was stressed. It was also stressed that because of the economic measures adopted, increasingly desperate Saddam became more dangerous and unpredictable. Saddam’s large expenditure on weapons as well as the fate of Kuwait did much to convince Fahd completely. The only concern was that the deployment could become very protracted. After that, the deployment was quick. Since the initial deployments were especially vulnerable, information about them was kept in strict secret. The plans were to deploy 250,000 troops by the 1st of December. A line in the sand was drawn.

Saddam understood that he had a better chance to survive fighting a war. The only other option available was unconditional withdrawal, which would ruin his reputation in his own country. Also, he hoped that his troops would fight better when defending their own territory.

Saddam hoped to use hostages to get public opinion in the West against the war. He captured hostages and told the West that they would be killed should the war begin. This misfired badly. It was once showed on TV that Saddam captured a five-year-old boy. The Western opinion against Saddam was ignited. People understood that they had to fight with Saddam. A seizure of 8,000 of Russian technicians destroyed the pressure in the USSR to support Saddam. Now the USSR was no longer conflicted. So Saddam failed to manipulate the public opinion. But he thought that the attempts by the Russians and the French to resolve the situation peacefully were signs of weakness, while in effect they were warnings.

The Americans did not like to suffer losses. Hussein thought that he could ignite public opinion against the war in the US by causing them to suffer losses. The terrain did not give him the advantage, as it did to the Vietnamese and the Koreans. Also after the Vietnam war the US changed its strategy of fighting – the army was re-designed.

The US scrapped national service in 1973 – instead volunteers were used. Now there was no use to protest because people chose to sign up to fight. So it was hard to ignite public opinion. Also the experience in Korea and Vietnam, the army was re-designed. It was taught to maneuver (not the large amount of men) the war, the master military art, the operational art (not to rely on firepower, but other things such as coordination) and tempo. The American army was purged of sloppiness after Vietnam. Also, the aircraft were emphasised. These new skills were to be applied to Iraq. The US fought an air-land battle, the idea was not new, but well-applied. New equipment came into use as well – new tanks (e.g. M1A1 tank, AH64 Apache Attack Helicopter – specially designed to operate together with tanks, A10 Warthog Ground Attack Aircraft – designed to cope with large enemy force in difficult situation, most of these were computer controlled, Multiple Launch Rocket System, Patriot anti-Missile System on Launcher). They were meant to fight the Soviet Army, not some third-rate Iraqi army. The US also re-thought its tactics. Thus, army was retrained to fight a general war at maximum intensity all the time; the Weinberger Doctrine – there were no open-ended conflicts and the US would not go into any war without a definite goal to achieve (i.e. linkage between military and national policies); the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Central Command – there was to be no more micro-management of the war. Powell – to use military force only when it was important to the country and when the goal was clear and Schwarzkopf. Both had a major role in re-designing the army. It was not like the disorganised team that emerged in Vietnam. Everything was clearly laid out.

This US armed forces was trained and equipped to fight and destroy the Soviet army in a total war. All this structure was used now against Iraq. Iraq had to face American military preparation for WWIII. Terrain was not suitable for guerilla war. Also there were no civilians to get in the way of the maximum tempo of the military operation. It was going to a theatre where it could unleash its full power without serious restrictions.

How did the war escalate? It was deployment of troops into Saudi Arabia, then – involvement into the War. The diplomacy was ratcheted up by the military developments and vice versa.

The ‘speed bump’ deployment lost chance. Hussein hoped that by staying stubborn politically to prevent the war. On the other hand, military logic taught that he should leave now, else he would lose everything. He was conflicted.

The US air armada was introduced and stabilized the military situation within a month. Saddam could go no further. From then on, the US increased military power expanded the number of choices Bush had and limited the number of choices for Saddam. The US was prepared to use a hammer to crush an ant because it would allow her to win the war quickly and with minimum losses. There was no choice but to fight a war and options pointed towards favourability of the use of large force. The US only had to choose between the ground and the air forces.

Bush made another very smart move – he mobilized the reserves – he no longer wanted to keep the war on the sidelines of national policy. LBJ did that to give more priority to his policy of the Greater Society and such a multi-tasking was a disaster. Also Bush decided to make the cause of the war clear and not use some controversial pre-texts like Tonkin Gulf.

It was decided to use limited war – this was by consensus between the USA, Britain and France. The coalition was pooled. All the members contributed large amounts of military forces. The UN SC resolution was to be implemented, not American unilateral action. It was decided to evict the Iraqi army from Kuwait. The war was not a stalemate, which was hoped to eventually force the enemy to the negotiations table. The US was to use a devastating blow to force unconditional surrender. This sense of togetherness worked in keeping the coalition together.

It was clear that Saddam was not going to withdraw. The eviction of Iraqi Army from Kuwait was known as the Desert Storm. However, there were debates with regards to the kind of operation to be used. The debate was not secret. It was a very clear signal to Saddam that the war would come if the Iraqi Army did not withdraw. There was the largest concentration of firepower the NATO ever assembled. To be on the safe side, the US committed more than 400,000 troops.

Bush used Extra Mile Diplomacy to eliminate accusations in aggression – the last chance was given to the US. Baker and Aziz met on the 9th of January in 1991 – to make sure that Saddam understood that the US will not tolerate any use of weapons of mass destructions and that Saddam would be held responsible for any use. This was done in order to make sure that Saddam was not deluded by his advisors.

By his diplomacy, President Bush convinced the world opinion there was no other choice but war. The war plan was designed to win a decisive military victory in a limited war. The limits were strictly set by the coalitions. Hussein did not preempt this because he hoped to avoid war and keep booty – hoped to outstare his enemy.

There was no question about the war and the war was not to be a major problem. However, there was a possibility of a political problem. Saddam saw the problem from a different view. He provoked the international reaction, and there was a war against the US to be fought. Now he thought that he had a better chance to survive by fighting and losing the war rather than by losing it. This was an important issue to the US, who did not want to suffer losses.

Persian Gulf became the Coalition Lake – there the bulk of the naval force of the Coalition was concentrated.

Iraq. Saddam hoped to bait the Coalition into an early ground offensive and inflict heavy losses on it. He knew that in an air war he would be heavily outnumbered and would not stand a chance of winning. He knew that the Coalition was planning to deliver an air strike on him and deliver very heavy casualties. Saddam hoped to wage a war of attrition to at least win a political victory to save his life. To achieve that end, he provoked a battle by invading a small Saudi town. The US engaged all the forces to strike back and organized an aerial attack. Despite storm, the air force was still very capable and smashed the bait. It was the sign that the Coalition forces, not Saddam would dictate the course of the battle and would not be gullible.

By waging a ground war he hoped to incur casualties to the Americans, hoping that public opinion at home would turn against the war. At first he was confident, hoping that his confidence would deter the allies from attacking. He also reminded the Americans of chemical and biological weapons, hoping that this would act as another deterrent. Indeed, his use of such weapons against his own people showed that he would not stop in front of anything. Soon, however, he betrayed his doubts on the TV.

He then decided to bait the allies into attacking him with ground forces. For that, he attacked them in Saudi Arabia with small forces, at a town of Khafji. It was on the border with Kuwait and was only lightly defended. However, his force was detected and aircrafts were called in. Saddam tried again on 20-21st January. This time there was no early detection, but Americans managed to strike that force very severely, although 11 Marines were killed on the American side. The town was briefly taken, as the Saudis did not expect the invasion. An Arab force was sent to re-capture the town in order not to give the Iraqis the psychological advantage. The Iraqis were quickly defeated. Despite their defeat, the Iraqis achieved a measure of surprise and this derailed the allies for a while. However, at the same time, Saddam demonstrated the vulnerability of his army to the aerial attacks.

The only option Saddam had was to portray the US to people at home as a bully and try to get the public opinion on his side. Powell replied: “First, we are going to cut it off. Then we are going to kill it.” (23 January) – this is what he planned to do to the Iraqi army. The cutting off was to happen geographically and technically – through supply and communications cutting off. So the Iraqi army was to be trapped. The air strike was meant to give Saddam a chance to give up and save the ground war. The campaign of the Coalition was already planned.

However, the connection between the political ends and the military means was perfect and integrated right from the start. (Compare with Vietnam War: there was no such linkage and the military actions were misread).

Right from the start the allies were under pressure to end the war as soon as possible and this presented some consternations to planning. The question was whether the public would tolerate the weeks of bombing. For that, Colin Powell gave a press conference to get the media work on his side. Soon the strategy was appreciated by the public as the means of avoiding high casualties. The coalition understood the motives behind Saddam’s move and did not play into his hands.

The “Air War” was to start – the Shield was to become a Storm. “Air War” – was the label given by the media.

Instant Thunder – an operation, a military name. It was deliberately called so to contrast with the “Rolling Thunder”. There was no intention to escalate the pressure and to build-up pain. Rolling Thunder was meant to force North Vietnam to the negotiations table. People who planned Instant Thunder fought in Vietnam and planned not to send any signal as before, but to strike the enemy as hard as possible and to immediately take away all the enemy’s means to fight. For the first time, there was a phased strategy of the war, prepared to work at any stage. It was to work in any circumstances. Hence the contrast with haphazard planning of the Vietnam War.

The coalition depended too much on the preparation of the battlefield. It was planned that 50% of all ground forces and 90% of Iraqi aviation be destroyed before the coalition ventures into the ground war. Planning estimated that this kind of degradation would take up to a month. Again, Schwarzkopf worked towards the correct portrayal of the campaigns in the media. He wanted to avoid the use of ‘carpet bombing’, which would have meant something indiscriminate and caused protest. Instead, he wanted to focus on key targets such as ammunition warehouses – there were 26 of them – 7 primary and 19 secondary, bridges. The attacks on bridges involved civilian casualties and had to be carried out with especial care. The Iraqis used fake bridges to divert attacks. In the meantime, the operation was being delayed from proceeding to the Kuwaiti theatre because of overcast weather.

On January 17, the entire country was hit. Air defence sites were hit first and the hardest. The question was whether the Iraqis were able to put up a defence against the raid. The course of the attack showed that in the first raid only 2 planes were shot down – so the loss rate was insignificant. So the Coalition had the total control of the air and could do what it wanted, the Iraqis could not compete. The Iraqi equipment was up-to-date because it was provided by the Soviets, but they were not trained to use it well, which rendered it useless (the war is about command, communication and information, without those, equipment is useless). The Iraqis could not imagine the Coalition coordinating such a large air force. This showed a great sophistication at the technological and military sophistication of the coalition. After all, that army was created against the Soviets. The only problem was to lose as few people as possible. The aerial attacks went on for five weeks. The objective was to smash Iraq’s war making power. Iraq’s air defences and war infrastructure were shattered, at little cost.

The attacks did jeopardize the politics of the coalition. There were claims that the Coalition was using air force to massacre the civilians. The influence of the media was great – television coverage brought the war back to people’s homes. The news networks that provided 24-hour coverage of the war and only during the Gulf War did people realize how important the information was. The media labeled the operation the “Air War”. The journalists could not interview the Americans in charge of the operation, but they interviewed the Iraqis – and showed the war from the Iraqi side. Saddam used the opportunity to affect the civilians. Such a strategy resulted in a debate about the use of ground forces. This was done in order to create sensations and sell the news. This debate was artificial, but it was new and interesting to the people. People realized they could follow the war intimately.

Te debate was serious enough to generate controversies and popularity, but not serious enough to upset the plans of the Coalition. The Coalition followed the pre-defined strategy and did not allow itself to be baited. The plan was initially designed to destroy Iraqi war making power and to smash them, but air power was not enough to do that, despite the fact that the air men believed that it would be enough. There was a lively discussion of the targets to be hit. The air force wanted to continue hitting the remainder of air defences, but the ground forces wanted it to hit the ground forces. The air strike precision was extremely high due to technology. The media reinforced the view that the bombs were very accurate and this led to the view that everything could be destroyed from the air.

F117 aircrafts were invisible to the radars and could destroy the air defences. Cruise missiles were another powerful weapons, and so were B52 nuclear bombers – they were especially useful in places where there were no civilians. Being so accurate and so strong, they were dangerous, as they made wars seem easy, as few men and few pieces of equipment were lost.

It was difficult for the US to assess the damage made – there was no good reconnaissance equipment. Moreover, the allies could not assess the strength of defence lines. However, Schwarzkopf took the task seriously and artistically. It was not without problems. The airforce claimed that it was too conservative because more effort than Schwarzkopf was prepared to attribute was given to the campaign. The CIA, on the contrary, claimed that they should only trust satellite and reconnaissance aircrafts reports, which were inaccurate. It was however confirmed that the supply lines remained unaffected allowing food and ammunition being shipped to the front. 17th February was identified as one of the earliest tentative days for invasion, but it was being repeatedly moved back because of the inadequacy of the effects of the air operations.

It was, however, necessary to supplement air attacks with ground offensive, as a prolonged delay could create an impression of the invincibility of the Iraqi army. Moreover, the onset of the bad weather damaged the prospects for the ground attack and the army was losing the peak of its form. In the meantime, the military cooperated closely with the politicians. Powell and Cheney came to the Iraq border to discuss the state of affairs. Bush wanted bombing to continue.

Saddam capitalized on that and demanded that health industry and civilians were suffered. He played the consciousness card and it seemed to be working.

As soon as fighting began, the USSR was careful to renounce Iraq, but did not promise any military intervention and even withdrew the two ships from the Gulf. However, the USSR did not interfere against the USA either. The USSR continued to emphasise peaceful resolution of the conflict. The response from Baghdad towards negotiations was usually defiant. Through such efforts the USSR hoped to improve her international image in order to obtain much-needed aid. Also, inside the USSR, the politicians were using involvement in the Gulf War as the leverage in their political struggle.

The US was irritated, but also realized that this was not a time for proud gestures. So, to get the Russian support, the US decided to issue a joint statement, that read that the US and the USSR would come together to promote peace and stability in Israeli-Arab relations. Israel was furious that she was not informed and it cost the US some effort to indicate that no threat was intended. Primakov was appointed as Gorbachev’s personal emissary to Iraq to convince Saddam to enter negotiations. He also offered Saddam some face savers, such as acceptance of the linkage. Saddam remained defiant, but betrayed his fears nevertheless. He then insisted that the USSR should help him secure Iraqi safety upon withdrawal. At last, Iraq agreed to cooperate with the USSR on questions of stability, including the situation in the Gulf. However, this mention of the Gulf seemed casual and not serious. At last, there was a message from Baghdad saying that Iraq was prepared to act on Resolution 660. This was for the first time since 1990 that Saddam referred to the possibility of leaving Kuwait.

However, he did not abandon his ‘linkage’ to Israel leaving Palestine, Golan and Lebanon, as well as cancellation of the UN resolutions against Iraq. Moreover, he demanded that his right to Kuwait was recognized, which meant that he was not prepared to withdraw. He also claimed that Iraq’s foreign debt was forgiven and that the allies helped in reconstruction of Iraq. This caused the proposition to be dismissed by the allies. No further efforts to mellow it down on the part of the Iraqis succeeded.

This proposition engendered confused reactions from the Arabs. The Jordanians recognized his claims as legitimate Arab claims. But not others, especially the Saudis and the Syrians.

Iraq responded by renewing threat to use nuclear weapons. This only frightened the US further, as she thought that Saddam grew desperate. Air campaign was intensified and preparations for the land war – sped up.

In the USSR there was a build-up of hardline opposition and it stated that all the debates in the Security Council masked a preparation of the massacre of the Iraqis. Gorbachev again tried to propose a plan (18th February) to the Iraqis hoping for a peaceful resolution. The allies were not enthusiastic, as the land war was about to start. For a moment even, there were fears in Washington that the USSR was still pursuing the Cold War strategy and was trying to sabotage the plans of the allies. The US decided to act tough and still attack unless Iraq upheld all the UN resolutions. Saddam was acting tough as well.

Eventually, he did propose to withdraw unconditionally in accordance to the Resolution 660, but the mention of details was very sketchy and the allies were not satisfied. This would have also meant that all the subsequent resolutions were to be declared illegitimate and this would in turn imply that the UN gave up its positions. Also, resolution 660 was too sketchy about the details. The allies decided to give Saddam a week to conform with all the requirements, hoping that during this time, Gorbachev will convince Saddam. In the meantime, the Iraqis started destroying Kuwaiti oil. When Kuwaitis were started being executed, the allies cut down the response time to 24 hours – Saddam was to withdraw from Kuwait by the 25 of February. Saddam did not comply and the war began. On the 24th of February, Bush instructed Schwarzkopf to use all the forces available including the ground forces to eject Saddam from Kuwait.

Scud rockets presented another political and psychological problem, as they had great explosive power and low accuracy. The US placed only a second priority on hunting out the scuds, as it was more important to handicap other Iraqi forces too. They were formerly used in cities, where they were bound to hit something. The Iraqis fired scuds in two directions – the Saudi Arabia and Israel, hoping that it would provoke Israel into responding. It almost worked. The explanation was the Jewish conspiracy, PLO supported that, but not the rest of the world. It was feared by the Coalition that Israel would respond. In its hunger for news, the CNN got it wrong – it reported that chemical weapons were fired on Israel. It was feared that Israel might retaliate with a nuclear strike. Israel did not retaliate, because she realized that it would play into Saddam’s hands, although it was against the traditional strategy. Also Bush told Israel not to stir and the Coalition prevented Israel from retaliating by not giving it air clearance.

Nevertheless, it did distract the Coalition on trying to seek out the mobile launchers that launched the rockets. The rocket attack failed to achieve its initial objectives – to get Israel to intervene and to confuse the Coalition. The Americans also loaned some anti-missiles, which was a highly symbolic move, and a persuasion not to intervene. It was useless, as they were likely to intercept the rockets over a populated area.

The most important thing in that war for the Coalition was to keep its nerve and not to accept any hasty decisions. Saddam also realized that it was the button that he had to push.

Air power was always going to be a battle winning edge for the ground forces – so the ground forces had to take part, the air force could not destroy everything. However, the air force could destroy the communications – e.g. the bridges or the roads and airports. Iraq was desert and the communications were easy to be identified and attacked. The objective was substantially achieved on schedule.

A new tactic came into being – “tank plinking” by the F111 was the key breakthrough. F111 were slow enough to hit the Iraqi tanks that in the desert conditions were the most important pieces of warfare.

Thanks to media, people thought that the ground stage would not be necessary. But the offensive with the entire coalition force was started. The only concern the Coalition had was that the Iraqi forces would use chemical and biological weapons. Climate did not disadvantage the Coalition troops. Like the Iraqis themselves, they came from cities not the desert. It turned out that the American troops were better adjusted to fight in desert than the Iraqis. Also, an additional advantage was given by the excellent communication and technology. The real worry were the T72 Main Battle Tanks, designed by the Soviets. However, the Americans were trained to fight against the Soviet equipment and so were the British, who contributed their specially designed tanks, which were superior.

Iraqi’s objective was to get the Americans to attack the ground forces reinforcements along the borders – dug tanks, mine fields etc.. They assumed that the allied attack would take a form of Marine landing. So defences were created along the coastline. Later, the adjustments were made to protect the road to Wadi al-Batin. West was left rather defenceless, as it was difficult to defend a desert, which had few natral obstacles and allowed the enemy to move very fast. These were indeed strong defences, but outdated against the American army. The last thing the Coalition was going to do was to play the enemy’s game. The defences were concentrated along the southwestern border, and the Iraqis expected that the northern desert was too difficult to navigate and the Coalition would go closer to the coast or be deterred. The Iraqis hoped to slow down the allies with the frontline defences and then to counter attack from behind with the Republican Guard. But the frontline defences were rather weak, considering the fact that the best troops were left in reserves. Iraq did not have up to date surveillance aviation and had few means of controlling the course of the battle by responding quickly to enemy’s moves. Moreover, the Iraqi troops were demoralized, especially by the American bombing’s cutting off of their supplies.

The Americans had good means of surveillance. Thus, they realized that Iraq was preparing to a positional war and did not play into Saddam’s hands. Moreover, the US could watch how Iraq modified the defences. The 50% attrition mark, that was desired, was not reached. The incident at Khafji revealed that the Iraqi army was badly coordinated with the central command, that the command was sluggish, equipment was not in a good workable state. Discipline was poor and army was lacking essential supplies. Moreover, the Iraqi army was afraid of the coalition. Many were deserting. Nevertheless, the Americans did not expect a walkover victory.

However, the Iraqis did not take into account the ability of the Coalition to navigate, supply and coordinate the army (thanks to the GPS system) – it could move and could continue moving. The Iraqis could not do this and did not expect others to be able to do it. Schwarzkopf planned to engage the Iraqis forces and attention by a small force. The navy made the Iraqis think that the attack was coming from the sea. In the meantime, the light forces went off the coast and drove around the defence lines (they went to the west of Wadi) to prevent the Iraqis reinforcements from coming down from Baghdad. The lighter forces would attack the Republican Guard from behind, when it was moving to the coast, when it least expected it. Heavy forces were expected to join in from the south and west and to attack the Republican Guard. Territory did not allow the Iraqis a chance of good defence, like it did in Korea and Vietnam.

A pretended amphibious landing was planned on the coast of Kuwait to distract the defence lines by making them think that the bulk of the forces was coming by sea – Desert Sabre (marine attack across Kuwaiti-Saudi border). To enable that operation, mine-clearing took place for days. Iraqi Navy was eliminated and the coalition had 120 ships in the Gulf. SAM platforms were also attacked. Shore defences were attacked from the sea.

The First and the Second Marine divisions and the Tiger Brigade had the task of crossing the border and attacking the frontline defences. To their left, there were Arab forces whose job was to prevent reinforcements from getting through. The Arab forces did well enough not to be a burden. This was the most dangerous of all the operations. However, good reconnaissance jobs were carried out and gaps in defences were identified, also the positions of the artillery were detected. The marines were to have air and fire support.

The attack (G-Day) began at 04.00 am on the 24th of February. Bad weather harmed the Iraqis more than the Americans, as they had fewer vision aids.

The Marines did so well, on sea and land – they broke through, although it was not expected of them, as they did not have enough air and firepower support, they forced Schwarzkopf to accelerate the main attack. They recaptured the Kuwait City. They did not wait for the slower moving Arab units, but pressed on. The Marines revealed how mismatched the powers were. They entered Kuwait too fast and created problems for the Coalition. After all, the Marines were supposed to have killed the Republican Guard and this was supposed to be the personal guard of Saddam.

The task of the XVIII Corps was to advance to the west of the theatre of the operations on the road leading from Kuwait to Euphrates, thus isolating the Iraqi army. Afterwards, they were to move to the east to help attacking the Republican Guard. The VII Corps were to attack west of the Kuwaiti border to destroy Republican Guard forces.

The French were to defend Kuwaiti border at al-Salman.

The attack by the VII Corps was launched 12 hours early than expected. Iraqi forces were swept off. The Iraqi commanders assumed that the VII Corps were to take Kuwait City, but then realized that the Republican Guard was the target. The XVIII Corps attacked 15 hours earlier, because there was no enemy activity in the region. They went forwards, leaving behind fake radio traffic to make the Iraqis think they were still there.

Instead, XVIII Corps the Guard cut off altogether the Iraqi Army. The results of the first day of war were a walkover. VII Corps killed it with some help. (all together, the two corps comprised 235,00 troops and 95,000 tanks) The actions were annihilating. They covered 800 km in twelve days. The Iraqi tanks were killed even before they could retaliate. Again, not the equipment, but the skill was decisive.

Chemical weapons were not used. This was so because their use would have toughened the surrender terms. The Iraqis were surrendering en masse. On the 26th of February, 30,000 POWs were taken. The Republican Guard in the meantime was encircled inside Iraq by the coalition army. The marines captured Kuwait City and on the 28th February, the Kuwaitis were ready to retake their capital.

The advance went through Iraq stopping only to regroup, because they were moving too fast. The Iraqis were shocked because there was too much force coming at them faster than they expected.

It all turned into a rout. Any Iraqi formations that stood and fought were torn to pieces. There was no coordination among them, Hence they were even less effective. When the Iraqis tried to pull out of Kuwait City, it was too late, they bumped into the reinforcements that were coming from the north. The retreat from Kuwait was decimating. The army retreated and took whatever it could – it was caught in the process of plundering. This was the end of the military campaign, but politically, it only instigated emotions.

The Coalition mistakes were the only thing that allowed the Iraqi forces to escape at all. Air-Land fighting power and the ability to fight at maximum tempo were the main reasons for this rout.

Saddam agreed to withdraw from Kuwait. The army was left in the field demoralized. Saddam tried to do all he could to salvage the rest of his army. Loss of face that he suffered was the worst dishonour. Saddam still tried to avoid fulfilling all the twelve resolutions, hoping to pay off the West. When the Iraqis were withdrawing from Kuwait City, they shot at the reconnaissance aircraft, preventing the monitoring of the withdrawal. The US attacked the convoy before it could dig in. It sped up the war conclusion, but also inspired conversations of inhumanity.

The ceasefire: limited war and damage control. The issue of ceasefire asked what was the purpose of the war and whether it should be continued for another day. Schwarzkopf insisted that the war was to be continued since not all the Republican Guards were destroyed. They were dedicated to the dangerous regime. Although this view was not publicly discussed, but the Arabs agreed thinking that it was a good idea to keep Saddam protecting himself. Bush and Powell were against it. The war was fought to enforce the UN resolution and not to topple the Iraqi regime. It was very tempting to overrun the entire country. Schwarzkopf wanted to ensure that the Republican Guard was battered so badly that it could not carry out acts of aggression against its neighbours. There were still two divisions of 700 tanks each ready to fight. There were another 2000 tanks yet to be caught. Nevertheless, he was willing to comply with the political decision from top. The objective was to end the war as soon as possible after all the starting objectives were achieved to minimize unnecessary killings. Now, military decisions did not stand in the way of political ones.

When Schwarzkopf reported that there was no Iraqi army in Kuwait and nothing threatened the Coalition forces, so the war could be called off and cease-fire terms were to be drafted. The US suffered relatively insignificant losses and Bush did not want to continue the war. The war lasted for symbolic 100 hours. It took some effort to persuade the British that the imminent immediate ceasefire was necessary. The Arabs were most disconcerted with the decision, especially the Saudis. However, they were in no position to object.

The CNN announced that the hostilities would cease in 5 hours’ time – note how the news companies participated in the making of the war. During these five hours the last battle was to take place. An Iraqi division: Hammurabi Armoured Division and remnants of Nebuchadnezzar Infantry Division escaped over Hawr al-Hammar Highway. The allies shot at them from the artillery and the attack was being prepared, when the news of the ceasefire came. The attack was aborted so that not to interfere with the peace talks. The Iraqi were free to flee, but chose to fire, and the allies retaliated.

Saddam still tried to present his withdrawal as a voluntary act and refused cease-fire meeting. Moscow convinced him that there was no choice. The Security Council drafted the terms to which Saddam had to agree before a ceasefire was signed – to return all the Kuwaiti property, release all POWs and abducted Kuwaiti citizens, to help with clearance of mines and booby traps.

Body counts were ruled out by the US as an attempt to further purge the memory of Vietnam, where such body counts were used as estimates of victory. By rough estimates, the Iraqis had about 35,000 killed, 1,000 out of which were civilians and 60,000 wounded during the entire operation (land and air).

The Gulf War was fought because Saddam Hussein believed he would certainly die if he did not fight it, but might live if he did – and because the US led to Coalition, including Arabs and Soviets, was not prepared to let him keep Kuwait. It was fought to restore Kuwait. There was never any intention to use coalition ground forces to topple Saddam Hussein. It was expected that the Iraqi people would overthrow him. There was a wide-spread belief that Saddam’s govt. would be toppled or he would flee. It was reinforced by the belief that it was that way. This thinking pushed the war to a stop – it was thought that there was no need to keep fighting it. People rose in rebellion and the Bush administration encouraged them, although there was no intention to send in the military force.

Many towns fell to the rebels, having started in Basra. The Republican Guard units surrendered. The Kurds started asserting their independence. However the allies did not send in help – they were not obliged to. They hoped that the rebels would remove Saddam, but could not interfere. The USSR and China especially opposed intervention. Wider objectives would mean higher casualties. A wide war could unhinge regional instabilities and encourage further conflicts by the neighbours who wanted to take revenge on Iraq and weakened Iraqi central govt. could encourage the separatist tensions. Nevertheless, many people favoured assassination of Saddam, although few wanted to it through continuing the war.

Bush mentioned that he would like to see Saddam step aside and the media took it as one of the objectives of the war. Again, it took some effort to refute such claims. It was insisted that only what was in the UN resolutions was the aim of the war. Taking Baghdad to replace Saddam threatened a quagmire and could be perceived by the Arabs as another cruel interference by the western capitalism and imperialism. Moreover, it was hard to believe that Saddam would survive this crisis and that deposing him would require any outside help. At the same time, the Arabs were afraid to see Iran reinforced by a strong pro-Islamic govt. arising in Iraq. It was better if Iraq was ruled by a strong hand, like that of Saddam. And it was better to have it established through a coup, than a revolution. So the coalition promised to recognize the new govt. and not to impose sanctions on it and compensation would be weaved. This was a controversial strategy, and the French felt it was immoral and against the UN principles.

Resolution 687 was passed on the 3rd of April, indicating close supervision of many areas of Iraqi internal affairs and UN peacekeepers along the borders. Iraq was to surrender all unconventional weapons and pay compensation to Kuwait. Under the new govt. all these were to be lifted. This was to give the Iraqi elite every incentive to end Saddam’s rule.

In the meantime, Bush started forging a strategy that would have ended Saddam’s rule through the American intervention, promising minimal casualties and avoidance of potential quagmire.

But Saddam survived, ironically helped by everyone’s belief that he would not tough it out. There was even sympathy directed at him for trying to survive. He tried to keep the allies at his borders to prevent any insurrection. He accepted all the demands in order to placate the allies. To reduce danger at home, he appointed his relatives and favourites into important positions. He also made several gestures of goodwill towards the Shi’ites by promoting his Shi’ite associate. In the meantime, Western attention returned to Europe, where the USSR was collapsing. He further announced a pay rise to civilians and the conscripts. Those who could not be bought were executed quietly. The Republican Guard was unleashed on the rebellions in the south.

The US was disconcerted by this and tried to intervene on the pretext that the ceasefire agreements were violated – e.g. the aircrafts were not allowed to fly. But at the top it was decided that the US should not intervene on the side of the rebels. There was however, an international show of indignation over the massacring of the Kurds. The Administration was accused of irresponsibility. Refuge problem was aggravated by Turkey’s refusal to accept them. The UN passed a resolution condemning the oppression of the Kurds and demanded that Iraq gave them access to international aid. However, setting international relief centres on the Iraqi territory without the Iraqi govt. consent was illegal and by ignoring the sanctity of borders the coalition would shoot itself in a foot. The persecution of Kurds led to the Western involvement in Iraq and highlighted Saddam’s problem. Iraq was still dictating the international agenda. The British wanted to pass the whole matter to the UN. The Administration took a political, not a legal decision to remove all the hints of help to the rebels. It shows that Saddam’s power to influence regional politics was still preserved, thanks to the Kurdish rebellion.

Saddam was using the economic embargo as an excuse for oppressing his people and the coalition was chastised for this. It made an attempt to break out – by authorizing the sale of $1.6 mil worth oil for the purchase of medicine and food for the people, but Saddam refused, feeling that this will undermine his power.

The Gulf War was indeed a sign of the future of warfare: but of its politics, not its operations. The application of forces was not what it used to be in 1945. At the time of the Cold War, deterrence politics was used – no fighting, but a lot of diplomacy, no massive involvement. This is what Saddam was counting on. But times changed, the Cold War was over and the new tactics and strategies evolved.

The fighting of the war created more problems that it solved. Saddam survived and understood the politics of his country better than anyone. The Iraqis did not even try to fight in Gulf War 2 in the desert. The New world order did not come into being. The USSR collapsed and did not become more liberal as a result. It was not possible to establish western-style democracy in the Middle East. No change was made on the Israeli question. There were limited changes though. Saudi Arabia promised more freedoms and Iran and Syria stopped holding Western hostages in Beirut. So, the process with Israel was allowed to move forward because of the war. Political disagreements remained the main issue in warfare. Kuwaiti oil industry was destroyed. The Americans finally learned how to fight limited wars militarily, at the time when it was no longer needed.

The USA did away with Vietnam syndrome and occupied her place at the centre of the international affairs. However, the Gulf War only strengthened the American predisposition to stay clear of civil wars.

The blame for starting the conflict is Saddam’s. He was a typical product of violent Arab politics in the 1960s. The West complicated the problem by letting the acquisition of lethal weapons by Saddam pass unnoticed and ignoring his maltreatment of his own people. This gave Saddam the impression that he could get away with anything. He was allowed to run into a huge debt, which kept the West in a bind. The West did not warn off Saddam from the terrible logic of his Kuwaiti campaign. It is, however, not clear whether the tougher stance of the Administration would have sufficed to deter Saddam.

The diplomacy further helped to reinforce the image of the Western indifference. When Saddam at last realized that the West was serious he fought to survive. France and the USSR tried to resolve the matter peacefully, by offering four possible options: change of regime in Kuwait, negotiations with the Kuwaitis on the territorial and economic questions, progress on other regional disputes and a promise that Iraq would not be attacked in the case of withdrawal. These were insufficient for Saddam to survive.

Economic sanctions failed because they were not linked to more promising diplomacy. They could have made a difference only if they undermined the political stability.

Military pressure did not work, because Saddam believed that it could be averted. There were no explicit threats to his personal rule – something that would have had the effect – so the action failed. Saddam’s problem was that he underestimated the allied capability. The power of the allied forces was not made clear to Saddam and he actually confused the Iran’s army with the allied army. Saddam was on the military defensive, but on the political offensive throughout the course of the conflict and after it. However, the allies did a right thing by attacking Saddam with all the might, otherwise, he had opportunities to prolong the conflict.

Oil played a vital role in the conflict. If not for oil, Kuwait would not have been invaded at all. It emphasised the emerging international politico-economic order. However, the West did not intervene just because of oil – the West impacted less than the Third World countries.

This time round the action by the UN was comprehensive and the member states pressed on till all the objectives were fulfilled. In major conflicts, this was unprecedented.



If you have any comments or questions, drop me a line at katie_d12@yahoo.com